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I. INTRODUCTION 
Terrorist attacks precipitate a collective emotional outrage. Calls by the 
injured body politic for justice and increased security pressure its leaders to un-
dertake a broad array of international and domestic responses. Part of a govern-
ment’s response to terrorism may be operational: an invasion or attack on 
another country or sub-national entity. This was the case in the aftermath of the 
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September 11 attacks as military operations were directed against Iraq, as a 
country, and Al-Qaeda, as a sub-state entity.   
Another aspect of a response to a terror attack may be legal. A signifi-
cant component of the American response to September 11 was legally-based 
changes to the structure of the government and authority under which it oper-
ates. A new cabinet department—the Department of Homeland Security 
(“DHS”)—was created along with a historic reshuffling of administrative agen-
cies.1 Moreover, a host of legal changes to domestic laws altering the range of 
permissible investigatory and intelligence-collecting tools was enacted as the 
PATRIOT Act.2
Post-September 11 sociopolitical dynamics are far from unique. Other 
events in American history have precipitated a legislative response to a terrorist 
threat. For instance, the April 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal 
Building in Oklahoma City led to a similar call to action and subsequent con-
gressional enactment.
   
3 The American polity, moreover, does not stand alone in 
responding to terrorist threats or attacks with legislation. Political violence in 
South Africa, for instance, prompted the then-apartheid government to pass a 
multitude of increasingly more restrictive measures designed to curtail the activ-
ities of the African National Congress.4
  
 * Chesterfield Smith Professor of Law Emeritus and Director, Center for International Crimes 
Studies, University of Florida Law School; Honorary Fellow, Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, 
University of London.   
 The United Kingdom also passed nu-
**  Attorney, Government of the District of Columbia; Senior Fellow, Institute for Human 
Rights, Peace, and Development, University of Florida. Portions of this Article were presented at 
the 27th International Symposium on Financial Crime, Jesus College, Cambridge University and 
Privacy Law: Perspectives of National Security, the First Amendment, the Media, and the Individ-
ual, Center for Governmental Responsibility, University of Florida Law School. Some of the 
viewpoints expressed in this Article also appear in RISKY BUSINESS: PERSPECTIVES ON CORPORATE 
MISCONDUCT (Shazeeda Ali ed., 2010). The authors gratefully acknowledge the research assis-
tance of Paige Hardy, Richard McDaniel, and Ivandra Smith. All viewpoints, errors, and omis-
sions lay solely with the authors and are not to be associated with others. This Article is in memo-
ry of Eugene T. Hague, Jr., a true West Virginian, consummate advocate, and fierce friend.  
1  See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135. 
 2 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (“PATRIOT Act”), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272. 
 3 See Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 
301, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). 
 4 See, e.g., Internal Security Act 74 of 1982 (S. Afr.); Affected Organisations Act 31 of 1974 
(S. Afr.); Terrorism Act 83 of 1967 (S. Afr.); General Law Amendment Act 62 of 1966 (S. Afr.); 
Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 96 of 1965 (S. Afr.); General Law Amendment Act 37 of 
1963 (S. Afr.); General Law Amendment Act 76 of 1962 (S. Afr.); Unlawful Organisations Act 34 
of 1960 (S. Afr.); Criminal Law Amendment Act 8 of 1953 (S. Afr.); Public Safety Act 3 of 1953 
(S. Afr.); Suppression of Communism Act 44 of 1950 (S. Afr.). 
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merous laws designed to combat terrorism in Northern Ireland and, later, Al-
Qaeda.5
Many anti-terrorism measures are enacted with broad public support.  
There is often a general willingness on the part of the public to accept greater 
civil liberties deprivations in the face of a specific threat, or otherwise in times 
of general crisis, than would otherwise be the case.
   
6 Sweeping anti-terrorism 
legislation is frequently crafted in reaction to the presence, or perceived pres-
ence, of immense, imminent danger. The medium- and long-term consequences 
of the legislation may not fully be comprehended when political leaders and 
policymakers take swift action in the face of strong public pressure because of a 
recent terrorist attack or continuing threat of violence. An unintended, and oft 
unforeseen, consequence of anti-terrorism legislation is that it may alter substan-
tive and procedural law. Various constitutional protections traditionally afforded 
to criminal defendants, and indeed the general public, may be eroded in the 
name of national security. Procedural law may also be affected by anti-terrorism 
legislation leading to substantive consequences that may not have been antic-
ipated by the law’s drafters, and staying on the books long after the immediate 
threat has passed. This socio-legal phenomenon is “mission creep”—the appli-
cation of anti-terrorism legislation, its substantive law and procedures, to non-
terrorist related offenses and other activities not contemplated in its original 
enactment.7
  
 5 See, e.g., Terrorist Asset-Freezing (Temporary Provisions) Act, 2010, c. 2 (Eng.); The Ter-
rorism (United Nations Measures) Order, S.I. 2009/1747 (Eng.); The Counter-Terrorism Act, 
2008, c. 28 (Eng.); The Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order, S.I. 2006/2657 (Eng.); Ter-
rorism Act, 2006, c. 11 (Eng.); Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, c. 2 (Eng.); Anti-Terrorism, 
Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24 (Eng.); Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11 (Eng.); Prevention of 
Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989, c. 4 (Eng.); Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary 
Provisions) Act, 1984, c. 8 (Eng.); Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1976, 
c. 8 (Eng.); Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1974, c. 56 (Eng.).  
   
 6 See Jeremy Waldron, Security and Liberty: The Image of Balance, 11 J. POL. PHIL. 191, 191 
(2003) (stating that there is a sense that a curtailment of liberty may be appropriate and that it may 
be unreasonable to insist on the same restrictions of government power that were present prior to 
an attack); Michael Welch, Trampling Human Rights in the War on Terror: Implications to the 
Sociology of Denial, 12 CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2003) (discussing the sociology of “moral 
panic” and the war on terror).   
 7 Risa Berkower, Sliding Down a Slippery Slope? The Future Use of Administrative Subpoe-
nas in Criminal Investigations, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2251, 2286 (2005) (noting mission creep 
could erode Fourth Amendment protections); James X. Dempsey & Lara M. Flin, Commercial 
Data and National Security, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1459, 1492 (2004) (noting that “mission 
creep” encompasses instances whereby “access to commercial sources of information for counter-
terrorism purposes, an agency or other agencies will then seek to use the information for purposes 
extending beyond counterterrorism, purposes that on their own would not have supported access 
to the information”); Matthew R. Hall, Constitutional Regulation of National Security Investiga-
tion: Minimizing the Use of Unrelated Evidence, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 61 (2006) (noting that 
the prospect of mission creep imposes a long term institutional danger); Richard Henry Seamon & 
William Dylan Gardner, The Patriot Act and the Wall Between Foreign Intelligence and Law 
Enforcement, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 319, 458–60 (2005). 
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One aspect of anti-terrorism laws that has received considerable atten-
tion has been the authority to, and standard by which, enemy combatants can be 
detained and tried.8
This Article takes a comparative approach to analyzing mission creep in 
anti-terrorism legislation and financial crimes, including its foundations, its 
forms, and its effects. In order to gain a complete perspective of mission creep, 
its judicial basis must be explored. This Article will examine how judicial pro-
cedures and substantive constitutional law may be altered in light of national 
security concerns, and how blanket deference to the executive in times of crisis 
may lead to medium- and long-term unintended consequences particularly as 
 Indeed, there are significant implications on separation of 
powers in the American government; the status and applicability of international 
law in the American legal framework; and what limits, if any, exist on the Pres-
ident in his or her capacity as Commander-in-Chief. Yet recent anti-terrorism 
legislation in both the United States and United Kingdom go well beyond tradi-
tional limits of constitutional authority. Domestic and foreign legislative res-
ponses to September 11 have made significant changes to the law governing 
financial crimes. New rules on civil forfeiture, asset freezing, financial privacy, 
and ordinary criminal jurisprudence have taken effect. These new rules are far 
from benign; financial and legal institutions, criminal defendants, and ordinary 
citizens are affected by their scope. Presently, financial and white-collar crimes 
are the areas of criminal law most at risk for mission creep from anti-terrorism 
legislation.   
  
 8 A multitude of articles have explored the jurisprudence and implications of military tribun-
als and presidential authority. See, e.g., Fionnuala D. Ni Aolain, Hamdan and Common Article 3: 
Did the Supreme Court Get it Right?, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1523 (2007); Mark A. Drumbl, The Ex-
pressive Value of Prosecuting and Punishing Terrorists: Hamdan, the Geneva Conventions, and 
International Criminal Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1165 (2007); David Fontana, A Case for the 
Twenty-First Century Constitutional Canon: Schneiderman v. United States, 35 CONN. L. REV. 35 
(2002); Amos N. Guiora, Quirin to Hamdan: Creating a Hybrid Paradigm for Detaining Terror-
ists, 19 FLA. J. INT’L L. 511 (2007); Douglas A. Hass, Crafting Military Commissions Post-
Hamdan: The Military Commissions Act of 2006, 82 IND. L.J. 1101 (2007); Neal K. Katyal & 
Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 
1259 (2002); Daniel Ryan Koslosky, Ghosts of Horace Gray: Customary International Law as 
Expectation in Human Rights Litigation, 97 KY. L.J. 615 (2009); Winston P. Nagan & Craig 
Hammer, The New Bush National Security Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 
375 (2004);  Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Enemy Combatant Cases in Historical Contest: The Inevi-
tablity of Pragmatic Judicial Review, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1005 (2007); Mark Rahdert, 
Double-Checking Executive Emergency Power: Lessons from Hamdi and Hamdan, 80 TEMPLE L. 
REV. 451 (2007); Eran Shamir-Borer, Revisiting Hamdan v. Rumsfeld’s Analysis of the Laws of 
Armed Conflict, 21 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 601 (2007); Ingrid B. Wuerth,  The President’s Power to 
Detain ‘Enemy Combatants’: Modern Lessons from Mr. Madison's Forgotten War,  98 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1567 (2004). Legal education has also taken up the cause with symposia and class offerings 
dedicated to national security law and public policy. See, e.g., Maxwell O. Chibundu, For God, 
for Country, for Universalism, Sovereignty as Solidarity in Our Age of Terror, 56 FLA. L. REV. 
883 (2004); Viet D. Dinh, Nationalism in an Age of Terror, 56 FLA. L. REV. 867 (2004); Winston 
P. Nagan & Craig Hammer, Patriotism, Nationalism, and the War on Terror: A Mild Plea in 
Avoidance, 56 FLA. L. REV. 933 (2004); Brad R. Roth, The Enduring Significance of State Sove-
reignty, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1017 (2004). 
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they relate to civil liberties. Part II presents historical instances of legislative 
responses to terrorism in both America and Britain. Specifically, the British 
“criminalization” policy, a response to political violence in Northern Ireland, 
will be examined. Northern Ireland presents an interesting case study of how 
anti-terrorism legislation can encroach upon the civil liberties of individuals 
accused of non-terrorism-related offenses. The British experience also demon-
strates how anti-terrorism legislation can perpetuate itself even where there is a 
relative decrease in violence levels or when the dynamics of the conflict have 
changed.   
The foundations of American national security law are also explored in 
Part II. American national security institutions have developed in contrast to 
their British counterparts. Rather than a legislative measure being enacted to 
respond to a specific danger, American jurisprudence has traditionally been on 
the forefront in responding to various threats of varying magnitudes. Special 
needs exceptions have been carved from the Fourth Amendment for reasons 
such as officer protection and school safety. Various judicial tests have also 
been formulated throughout American Courts of Appeal for prosecuting crimi-
nal defendants based on a theory of willful blindness or deliberate ignorance of 
criminal activity. In certain circumstances, criminal convictions have been sus-
tained even where the underlying conduct has not fully satisfied the mens rea 
requirement of the specific offense charged. Of course, there are instances 
where Congress has responded to specific threats such as the Oklahoma City 
bombing. Indeed, in responding to an act of domestic terrorism, the rules go-
verning the First Amendment and habeas corpus were significantly affected.  
All of these areas of substantive law have informed how anti-terrorism legisla-
tion operates in practice and can germinate into areas of substantive law. 
The anti-terrorism measures that have had the greatest impact on the in-
stitutional integrity of financial and legal systems, however, are the American 
and British legal response to the September 11 attacks. Part III begins by outlin-
ing traditional notions of bank secrecy and financial privacy. The British re-
sponse to September 11, with a particular focus on financial crimes, is presented 
in light of previous efforts to combat terrorist financing in Northern Ireland.  
Title III of the PATRIOT Act relating to financial crimes is also presented.  
Provisions of the Act relating to international financial crimes and money laun-
dering will be analyzed in light of traditional protections of financial privacy 
and underlying jurisprudence. Sections of the Act regarding information sharing 
between law enforcement agencies and the elimination of the distinction be-
tween intelligence gathering and criminal investigations will also be expounded 
upon. The current dynamics of mission creep resulting from both legislative 
initiatives and judicial responses is also presented. Finally, Part IV provides a 
brief conclusion, asserting that judicial institutions should remain vigilant in 
protecting constitutional rights when reviewing executive action.  
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II. LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF MISSION CREEP  
Mission creep can be a significant threat for the continued protection of 
civil liberties during a time of crisis, or the perception thereof.9
A. Criminalization and Terrorism: The Case of Northern Ireland 
 In order to fully 
analyze patterns in, and the effects of, this socio-legal phenomenon, anti-
terrorism legislation and its related jurisprudence will be examined in both the 
United States and Britain. Primarily, two responses to crises characterize the 
dangers inherent in anti-terrorist legislation with regard to inadvertent, often 
negative effects on other areas of substantive and procedural law. The first in-
stance is the “criminalization” strategy used by the British government to com-
bat Northern Ireland political violence. The second was the American legal re-
sponse to the Oklahoma City bombing. Both examples illustrate how anti-
terrorist legislation, operating within a greater legal framework, can have conse-
quences beyond what was originally intended by the legislation.  
Conflict in Ireland spans its entire history, with cyclical flashpoints of 
violence and relative tranquility. The Irish Free State was established after the 
Anglo-Irish War of 1919–1921, and an independent republic was declared in 
1949.10 Yet independence came at the price of the partition of the six northern 
counties of the island where Protestants/Unionists comprised a majority of the 
population.11 Electoral boundaries were established so as to give Unionists a 
disproportional advantage in the Northern Ireland Assembly at Stormont.12 Se-
curity measures were enforced by the sectarian paramilitary police: the B-
Specials and the Royal Ulster Constabulary.13
An ensuing escalation in the levels of political violence by nationalist 
paramilitaries followed, the most notable of which was the Provisional Irish 
Republican Army (“IRA”).
 
14 Tactics were a mixture of terrorism in the classical 
sense—targeting non-combatants with the purpose of communicating a political 
message15
  
 9 See supra note 
—and political violence directed against targets associated with the 
8. 
10 CONNOR A. GEARTY, TERRORISM 392–93 (1991). 
11 Id. at 377. 
12 Id. at 394; DAVID MCKITTRICK & DAVID MCVEA, MAKING SENSE OF THE TROUBLES: THE 
STORY OF THE CONFLICT IN NORTHERN IRELAND 22 (2002). 
13 GEARTY, supra note 10, at 115–16. For a general overview of the Northern Ireland conflict 
see generally MCKITTRICK & MCVEA, supra note 12, at 11. 
14 Other nationalist paramilitary groups operating in Northern Ireland were the Real Irish 
Republican Army (“Real IRA”), the Irish National Liberation Army (“INLA”), Saor Éire, Fianna 
na hÉireann, and Cumann na mBan. Corresponding unionist paramilitary groups also emerged in 
the region and included the Ulster Volunteer Force (“UVF”), Ulster Freedom Force (“UFF”), 
Loyalist Volunteer Force (“LVF”), and Red Hand Command (“RHC”).   
15 There is no consensus on what “terrorism” as a method of violence encompasses. For 
present purposes it is defined as intentional or reckless violence against the person or property of 
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British control of Northern Ireland.16 The escalation of violence, beginning in 
1971, resulted in a foreseeable government response: the enactment of emergen-
cy (i.e. temporary) anti-terrorism legislation.17
1. The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1974 
 Although the political violence 
peaked in 1972, the legal responses to political violence were renewed, ex-
panded, and applied to other areas of law despite a relative decrease in the level 
of violence. 
The primary British legal response to politically-motivated violence in 
Northern Ireland was the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 
1974.18 The Act was a direct political and legislative reaction to two pub bomb-
ings in Birmingham, England, and an increase in the level of violent attacks: 86 
explosions occurred in 1973.19 Indeed, political pressure mounted on the gov-
ernment in Westminster to deal with what was described as “the gravest threat 
[to Britain] since the end of the Second World War.”20 In introducing the Act in 
the House of Commons, then-Home Secretary Roy Jenkins described the legis-
lation as “draconian” and “unprecedented in peacetime.”21  He also went on to 
defend it as an enfacement that was fully justified to meet the “clear and present 
danger.”22
The three key provisions of the Temporary Provisions Act were pro-
scription, exclusion, and detention. Proscription established three new criminal 
offenses. First, membership in the IRA alone, absent any substantive conduct, 
 The House of Commons passed the Act less than forty-two hours 
after its introduction, without amendment.   
  
non-combatants to communicate a political message. See Haig Khatchadourian, Terrorism and 
Morality, 5 J. APPLIED PHIL. 131 (1988); Kai Nielsen, On the Moral Justifiability of Terrorism 
(State and Otherwise), 41 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 427, 428–30 (2003) (noting multiple definitions of 
terrorism); Igor Primoratz, State Terrorism, in TERRORISM AND JUSTICE: MORAL ARGUMENT IN A 
THREATENED WORLD 31, 37 (Tony Coady & Michael O’Keefe eds., 2002); Jenny Teichman, How 
to Define Terrorism, 64 PHIL. 505, 507 (1989). 
16 For instance, the bombing of the British Conservative Party Conference in Brighton in 1984 
was an assassination attempt on the Prime Minister herself rather than intended to communicate a 
political message. Conversely, the bombings of “Bloody Friday” were intended to communicate a 
political message without concern for the agency the twenty targets played in the chain of British 
rule of the territory. See GEARTY, supra note 10, at 344; ADRIAN GUELKE, THE AGE OF TERRORISM 
AND THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM 123–24 (1998). 
17 The term “anti-terrorism legislation” denotes legal responses to politically-motivated vi-
olence falling within and outside classical definitions of terrorism. See supra note 15 (noting the 
classical definition of “terrorism”). 
18 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1974, c. 56 (Eng.). 
19 K.D. EWING & C.A. GEARTY, FREEDOM UNDER THATCHER: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN MODERN 
BRITAIN 213–14 (1990). 
20 882 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1974) 743 (U.K.). 
21 882 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1974) 35 (U.K.). 
22 Id.  
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was sufficient to secure a conviction punishable by a term of incarceration of no 
more than five years.23 Soliciting or collecting funds for any proscribed organi-
zation was also punishable under the same provision.24 Second, it was deemed a 
crime to “assist[ ] in the arrangement or management” of a meeting of three or 
more people “knowing that the meeting is to support, or to further the activities 
of, a proscribed organization.”25 Third, anyone who publicly “wears any item of 
dress,26 or [ ]wears, carries or displays any article in such a way as to arouse 
reasonable apprehension that he is a member or supporter of a proscribed organ-
ization” could face up to three months in prison and a fine of £200.27
The Prevention of Terrorism Act, 1974, also granted the Secretary of 
State for Northern Ireland authority to exclude persons from the U.K. on the 
suspicion of terrorist activities.
   
28 If “satisfied” that “any person . . . is concerned 
in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism” the Secretary 
may prohibit the individual from entering or residing in the U.K.29 Additionally, 
if any person is “attempting or may attempt” to enter the United Kingdom with 
the intent to engage, or assist in an act of terrorism, the Secretary is authorized 
to prohibit the individual from entering Britain.30 Although there is an obliga-
tion to consider nonfrivolous representations made by the subject of an exclu-
sion order, the Secretary is only obligated to consult another appointed offi-
cial.31 Sole discretion to enter and enforce an exclusion order was vested with 
the Secretary.32
The most controversial provisions of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 
1974, however, were those pertaining to arrest and detention. An officer had the 
power to arrest anyone they “reasonably suspect[ed]” to be engaged or who 
 
  
23 Prevention of Terrorism Act, 1974, c. 56, § 1(1)(a).  
24 § 1(1)(b). The prohibition on IRA financing was drawn broadly. Any person who “solicits 
or invites financial or other support for a proscribed organisation, or knowingly makes or receives 
any contribution in money or otherwise to the resources of a proscribed organization” was punish-
able for a term of ten years imprisonment. Id.  
25 § 1(1)(c).  
26 § 2(1)(a).  
27 § 2(1)(b). For the rationale of the House of Commons regarding the prohibition on wearing 
politically communicative clothing see 882 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1974) 636 (U.K.) (arguing 
that the public should not be forced to be affronted by “public demonstrations” in support of the 
IRA); 38 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (1983) 633 (U.K.) (stating that IRA members should not be 
afforded the ability to “flaunt themselves in public”). 
28 Prevention of Terrorism Act, 1974, c. 56, § 3(1). 
29 § 3(3)(a).  
30 § 3(3)(a).  Exclusion orders, however, do not extend to persons residing in the U.K. for the 
previous twenty years or were born in the U.K. and resided there throughout their life. § 3(4)(a)–
(b). The burden of proof of demonstrating one has been a constant resident is on the suspect. § 
3(5). 
31 § 4(4). 
32 §§ 3(1)–(3), 5. 
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might partake in an act of terrorism or the support thereof.33 The suspect could 
be detained for forty-eight hours with a possible five-day extension upon ap-
proval of the Secretary of State.34 During this time the police may restrict out-
side communication to family and legal counsel.35 Moreover, the traditional 
common-law procedure of bringing an arrested person before a court was elimi-
nated in instances of suspected terrorists.36
2. The Permanence of the Temporary 
   
The 1974 Act, widely considered at the time to be a broad and sweeping 
incursion into traditional guarantees of civil liberties, was due to expire within 
six months of its enactment.37 Yet the 1974 Act was given two, half-year exten-
sions in 1975 and 1976 respectively, despite a dramatic drop in the death rate in 
Northern Ireland.  Yearly deaths related to the Northern Irish conflict peaked in 
1972 with 467.38 The rate dropped by over half as there were 247 conflict deaths 
occurring in 1975.39
A new Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act was 
enacted in 1976, with a renewal period of one year.
  
40 The 1976 Act was re-
newed annually until it was amended and reenacted in 1984.41 The 1984 Act 
was given a maximum life of five years prior to new legislation being required.  
Also significant was that the 1984 Act incorporated “international terrorism” 
into its provisions. After the five-year period, the Government in Westminster 
adopted the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989, which 
was subject to indefinite annual renewals.42 Violence levels during this time, 
however, had largely stabilized. Between 50 and 115 conflict-related deaths 
occurred annually between 1978 and 1994.43
  
33 § 7(1).  
 Much of the fluctuations in vi-
34 § 7(2). 
35 EWING & GEARTY, supra note 19, at 222.  
36 Prevention of Terrorism Act, 1974, c. 56, § 7(3). The Prevention of Terrorism Act, 1974, 
rendered inapplicable multiple due process safeguards relating to arrestees. Specifically, provi-
sions contained in the Magistrates' Courts Act, 1952, c. 55, § 38 (Eng.); the Children and Young 
Persons Act, 1969, c. 54, § 29 (Eng.); the Summary Jurisdiction (Scotland) Act, 1954, c. 48, § 
20(3) (Scot.); the Magistrates’ Courts Act (Northern Ireland), 1964, c. 21, § 132 (N. Ir.); the 
Children and Young Persons Act (Northern Ireland), 1968, c. 34, § 50(3) (N. Ir.) relating to due 
process and procedures of arrest were abrogated. See infra notes 65–77 and accompanying text 
(discussing changes in trial procedures and substantive law).   
37 Prevention of Terrorism Act, 1974, c. 56, § 12(1). 
38 GUELKE, supra note 16, at 112. 
39 Id.  
40 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1976, c. 8 (Eng.); see EWING & 
GEARTY, supra note 19, at 214. 
41 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1984, c. 8 (Eng.). 
42 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989, c. 4 (Eng.). 
43 GUELKE, supra note 16, at 112.  
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olence can be attributed to the conflict’s political dynamics: various declared 
ceasefires, renewed violent campaigns, and negotiations. The constant renewal 
of British anti-terrorist legislation notwithstanding the relative decline in the 
levels of violence in Northern Ireland show the self-reinforcing nature of legal 
responses to terrorism:  if there are no attacks, the legislation is working; if there 
is an attack, it is needed. Thus, a fundamental irony emerges: as the level of 
political violence drops, the legal responses designed to counter them streng-
thens.44
The Prevention of Terrorism Act, 1989 supplemented the original 1974 
Act with additional offenses and expanded police powers, including a provision 
providing for the forfeiture of funds and property relating to terrorism.
    
45 Deten-
tion without legal recourse was continued, as were exclusion orders without 
judicial review.46 The Prevention of Terrorism Acts served as the legal basis for 
future anti-terrorism legislation targeting violence associated with Al-Qaeda and 
related organizations.47
3. Distortions in the Criminal Law 
  
British anti-terrorism legislation, geographically applicable to only 
Northern Ireland at first, and then to the U.K. as a whole, was gradually ex-
panded in both scope and applicability.48 Corollary to the substantive offenses 
outlined in the Prevention of Terrorism Acts were changes in criminal proce-
dure. Anti-terrorism provisions morphed into the ordinary criminal law, having 
substantial implications for defendants. That is, not only did British anti-
terrorism legislation expand and perpetuate itself, it affected other areas of subs-
tantive and procedural law. The most blatant example of this was the use of ju-
ryless “Diplock” trials for “scheduled” offenses.49
  
44 EWING & GEARTY, supra note 
 
19, at 215. 
45 Prevention of Terrorism Act, 1989, c. 4, § 13.  
46 §§ 14–15. 
47 See, e.g., Terrorist Asset-Freezing (Temporary Provisions) Act, 2010, c. 2 (Eng.); The Ter-
rorism (United Nations Measures) Order, 2009, No. 1747 (Eng.); The Counter-Terrorism Act, 
2008, c. 28 (Eng.); The Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order, 2006, No. 2657 (Eng.); Ter-
rorism Act, 2006, c. 11 (Eng.); Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, c. 2 (Eng.); Anti-Terrorism, 
Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24 (Eng.); Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11 (Eng.). See also Mark 
Elliott, United Kingdom: Detention Without Trial and the War on Terror, 4 INT'L J. CONST. L. 553 
(2006) (discussing the expansion of detention periods in British anti-terrorism legislation). 
48 The Prevention of Terrorism Acts had general applicability throughout the United Kingdom, 
whereas the Emergency Provisions Acts were applicable solely to Northern Ireland. Fionnuala Ní 
Aolain, The Fortification of an Emergency Regime, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1353, 1354 (1996). 
49 Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1973, c. 53 (Eng.); Northern Ireland (Emer-
gency Provisions) Act, 1991, c. 24, § 1(1)(3); John D. Jackson, Katie Quinn, & Tom O’Malley, 
The Jury System in Contemporary Ireland: In the Shadow of a Troubled Past, 62 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 219 (1999). The Emergency Provisions Act, like the Prevention of Terror-
ism Acts, was subsequently revised and extended in 1987, 1991, and 1996. For a general back-
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The rationale of the juryless courts was embodied in the 1972 Diplock 
Report, which stated that the unique nature of paramilitary violence in Northern 
Ireland necessitated abrogating the right to a jury trial.50 Specifically, the pres-
ence of paramilitary groups and the threat of intimidation raised the question of 
the ability of jurors to render verdicts without considering possible repercus-
sions.51 There was also a perceived risk that sectarian loyalties in the jury pool 
might result in unjust acquittals or convictions.52
The Diplock Courts have, however, been widely used to prosecute of-
fenses unrelated to terrorism.
  
53 An average of 630 defendants per year were 
brought before Diplock Courts between 1980 and 1986.54 Yet, 40 percent of 
defendants brought before these special juryless courts were implicated in of-
fenses that had no political mens rea or content.55 Some solicitors have also 
admitted to using emergency provisions for offenses outside the scope of anti-
terrorism legislation.56 Additionally, juryless trials were statutorily required for 
non-scheduled offenses in instances where the defendant was also charged with 
a scheduled offense.57 Judges not satisfied that the defendant was guilty of a 
scheduled offense had discretionary authority to render a conviction if they were 
“satisfied that [the defendant was] guilty of some other offense . . . which a jury 
could have found him guilty.”58
Evidentiary standards were also altered for both jury and non-jury trials 
relating to apolitical and non-paramilitary offenses. In an attempt to clamp down 
on terrorist activities, judges’ common law rules were replaced by lower statuto-
ry standards regarding the admissibility of evidence.
  
59
  
ground of juryless trials in Northern Ireland see generally JOHN D. JACKSON & SEAN DORAN, 
JUDGE WITHOUT JURY: DIPLOCK TRIALS IN THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1995). 
 For example, evidentiary 
50 REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO CONSIDER LEGAL PROCEDURES TO DEAL WITH TERRORIST 
ACTIVITIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 1972, Cmnd. 5185 [hereinafter Diplock Commission]. 
51 Id. ¶ 36. 
52 Id.  
53 EWING & GEARTY, supra note 19, at 228. 
54 Id. at 229. The applications to prosecute a crime as a scheduled offense varied throughout 
the late 1970s and early 1980s. In 1978, for example, 1515 applications were made to prosecute 
such offenses. Id.  
55 Aolain, supra note 48, at 1378; GERARD HOGAN & CLIVE WALKER, POLITICAL VIOLENCE 
AND THE LAW IN IRELAND 122 (1989). 
56 Aolain, supra note 48, at 1378. 
57 Emergency Provisions Act, 1978, c. 5, § 7(3) (Eng.).  
58 § 7(4)(a)–(b) (emphasis added). It is also to be noted that some scheduled offenses could be 
tried summarily. 
59 Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1991, c. 24, §§ 11, 12 (Eng.); Peter Hall, The 
Prevention of Terrorism Acts, in JUSTICE UNDER FIRE: THE ABUSE OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN 
NORTHERN IRELAND 160–64 (Anthony Jennings ed., 1988). It is also to be noted that the standard 
for excluding evidence obtained through torture or other degrading treatment was lowered from 
that which would normally govern. See Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, c. 60, § 76(2) 
(Eng.) (provisions governing admissibility of confessions). 
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standards were changed to permit an inference to be drawn from a defendant’s 
silence at trial. If a suspect failed to mention a fact at arrest, and later attempted 
to rely on it during trial, an inference may be drawn based on the reasonableness 
of the omission.60 A defendant’s failure to explain any object, substance, or 
mark, or why he or she was in a particular location can also be used at trial to 
infer guilt, as can a failure to give evidence on one’s own behalf at trial.61
Another example of diminished evidentiary and procedural standards 
used in the United Kingdom in the furtherance of national security was the so-
called “supergrass” trials.
  
62 Derived from “informer” in Cockney vernacular, the 
supergrass trials permitted the secret, uncorroborated testimony of only one wit-
ness as sufficient to secure a criminal conviction.63 Conviction rates steadily 
rose to around 88 percent in 1983, with 55 percent of trials in Northern Ireland 
resting on uncorroborated, supergrass evidence.64 Typically, an informer would 
be given immunity from prosecution in exchange for testimony regarding the 
paramilitary activities of their associates. This testimony alone was sufficient for 
a conviction, yet it was often motivated by personal “vindictiveness” on the part 
of witnesses and informers, thereby increasing the risk of miscarriages of jus-
tice.65
The case of Joseph Charles Bennett is illustrative of how anti-terrorist 
legislation can corrupt substantive criminal and evidentiary law. Mr. Bennett 
was a criminal from an early age, first committing petit larceny at age eleven.
 
66  
He became involved in loyalist paramilitary activities and served six years in 
HMP Maze for a weapons conviction.67  While incarcerated, he became a bloc 
commander of incarcerated members of the Ulster Volunteer Force (“UVF”), a 
loyalist paramilitary organization.68
  
60 EWING & GEARTY, supra note 
 After being released, he stole £1,350 from 
coworkers and was thereafter sentenced to death in absentia by a UVF court-
19, at 229. 
61 See infra notes 65–77 and accompanying text (discussing changes in trial procedures).   
62 See generally STEVEN C. GREER, SUPERGRASSES: A STUDY IN ANTI-TERRORIST LAW 
ENFORCEMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1995); JAMES MORTON, SUPERGRASSES AND INFORMERS 
(2002); DERMOT P.J. WALSH, THE USE AND ABUSE OF EMERGENCY LEGISLATION IN NORTHERN 
IRELAND (1983). 
63 See Emergency Provisions Act, 1978, c.3, §§ 7(1)–(3) (Eng.) (providing for juryless trials 
for scheduled offenses and the jurisdictional reach of Diplock Courts as equivalent to that of a jury 
trial); HOGAN & WALKER, supra note 55, at 101 (discussing the context of the Diplock Courts).  
The term was first coined in London during the 1970s.  Evidently the nickname for an informer is 
“grass” which derives itself from “grasshopper;” rhythmic slang for “copper” which is Cockney 
terminology for policeman. GREER, supra note 62, at 1, n.1. 
64 GREER, supra note 62, at 252. 
65 Laura K. Donohue, Anti-Terrorist Finance in the United Kingdom and United States, 27 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 303, 414 (2006).   
66 GREER, supra note 62, at 61. 
67 Id. at 61–62.  
68 Id. at 62.  
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martial.69 As a result, Mr. Bennett informed police of incriminating evidence on 
eighteen UVF associates.70
A subsequent prosecution and trial of the eighteen defendants charged 
with various terrorism-related offenses was entirely reliant on Mr. Bennett’s 
testimony.
  
71 Yet, there was no official disclosure by the Royal Ulster Constabu-
lary or Director of Public Prosecutions of the nature of the immunity agreement.  
In fact, the only proof of the actual existence of immunity was Mr. Bennett’s 
own testimony.72 The presiding trial judge, Justice Murray, acknowledged that 
Mr. Bennett’s character was conducive of committing perjury.73 The defense 
argued that the Crown was required, under the common law, to demonstrate that 
a crime had occurred and that the accused was implicated in its commission.74  
The court summarily rejected these arguments and held that supergrass testimo-
ny need not be corroborated.75
Justice Murray found all but two of the eighteen defendants guilty de-
spite multiple discrepancies in Bennett’s testimony.
   
76 It was held that there was 
independent corroboration of Mr. Bennett’s testimony with regard to three of 
the defendants: they simply didn’t say anything to the police. That is, the defen-
dants’ silence was taken as “significant admission of involvement” as was per-
mitted under the Prevention of Terrorism Acts.77 Justice Murray was persuaded 
that Mr. Bennett had lied about several facts but held the fabrications to be 
“extraneous” and refused to exclude the testimony in its entirety.78
The sacrifices to civil liberties made in response to the emergency con-
tinued as the “temporary” legislation was renewed and expanded.
   
79
  
69 Id. 
 A Diplock 
trial was used to secure a conviction as recently as 2005, seven years after the 
70 R. v. Graham, [1983] 7 N.I.J.B. 23, 25–26. At trial Mr. Bennett stated that he “did not want 
to go to prison again” and that his safety “depended on [the] ability to name as many [people] as 
possible.” Id. 
71 GREER, supra note 62, at 62–63. 
72 Id. at 63–64. 
73 Graham, 7 N.I.J.B. at 69. 
74 See R. v. Baskerville, [1916] 2 K.B. 658 (Eng. A.C.). 
75 The exception carved out by the court allows the independent evidence requirement that a 
meeting took place to include meeting for unrelated, benign purposes. GREER, supra note 62, at 
65. 
76 Id. at 67 (sixteen of the eighteen defendants were in the trial; two were found guilty without 
Bennet’s testimony). 
77 Graham, 7 N.I.J.B. at 74. 
78 Id. at 87–88. 
79 See, e.g., R. v. Gibney, [1983] 13 N.I.J.B. 1. There were instances where supergrass trials 
were described as “nothing short of public spectacle.” GREER, supra note 62, at 71. Greer notes 
examples of over thirty defendants in the dock being convicted on the uncorroborated testimony 
of one witness. Id. at 71–72. Also present at the various cases were up to seventy heavily-armed 
police per courtroom, judges sporting bullet-proof vests during proceedings, and media coverage 
describing the very survival of Northern Ireland as contingent on the verdicts. Id.  
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official end of the Northern Ireland conflict.80 After the attacks of September 11, 
the original seven day detention, once described as draconian, was extended to 
indefinite incarceration without charge.81 What can be said, however, is that an 
external judicial check on the criminal process in Northern Ireland, and the 
United Kingdom generally—the European Court of Human Rights—was able 
to, at least somewhat, curtail the British legal metamorphosis to at least some 
extent.82
B. Responding to the Threat: The Case of the United States 
 Without an external, independent judicial check on special police pow-
ers the deprivation of due process may have been much more substantial.   
In contrast to the British experience, mission creep in American national 
security law did not arise from one primary threat. Rather, its roots are grounded 
in how the judiciary responded to numerous types of necessities from drugs in 
schools to money laundering to the safety of beat officers. There are three pri-
mary topics that warrant exploration in the context of national security: special 
needs exceptions, willful blindness jurisprudence, and legislative curtailment of 
habeas corpus. Each of these topics is unique in its design and application. 
However, each served as a key component in the construction of America’s do-
mestic security regime and continues to inform its operation.    
  
80 R. v. Abbas Boutrab, [2005] NICC 36. Mr. Boutrab was convicted in a Diplock Court in 
Belfast for being a member of Al-Qaeda. 
81 See Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24 (Eng.). Part IV authorized the 
indefinite detention of a person certified by the Home Secretary as a terrorist or threat to national 
security. The internment power was incorporated into the immigration control laws and is review-
able by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission. Evidence obtained by torture thereby is 
admissible in the administrative immigration tribunals otherwise excluded from criminal proceed-
ings.  In A, X, & Y & Others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, the Lord Chief Jus-
tice of England and Wales, Lord Wolff, held that indefinite detention did not violate the European 
Convention on Human Rights.  EWCA (Civ.) 1502 (2002). See Helen Fenwick, The Anti-
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001: A Proportionate Response to 11 September?, 65 MOD. 
L. REV. 724, 730–35 (2002); Philip A. Thomas, 9/11: USA and UK, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1193 
(2002). 
82 See Brogan v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1989) 117. In Brogan, the European 
Court for Human Rights (“ECtHR”) held that the detention of suspects in Northern Ireland for 
between five and six days violated Article 5(3) of the European Convention of Human Rights. 
Article 5(3) of the Convention provides in part that “[e]veryone arrested or detained . . . shall be 
brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and 
shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial.” Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, Art. 
5(3). Moreover, the ECtHR held in Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1978) 25, that the 
“five techniques”—wall-standing, hooding, continuous noise, deprivation of food, and deprivation 
of sleep—used by British authorities in interrogations in Northern Ireland violated the European 
Court of Human Rights.  
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1. Special Needs Exceptions  
Terrorism is not the only circumstance in which a court is willing to ap-
ply a lesser degree of privacy protection in order to protect against a prospective 
or perceived danger. In the United States, numerous circumstances have arisen 
which have led courts to find a lesser expectation of privacy or carve out a spe-
cial exception to an individual’s established privacy rights. One such exception 
has arisen under numerous circumstances to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 
requirement.83 This “special needs exception” was first elaborated in Terry v. 
Ohio.84
In Terry, the Supreme Court considered whether a police officer could 
conduct a “stop and frisk” without probable cause and prior to any crime being 
committed.
  
85 The case arose from a criminal prosecution of two defendants for 
carrying a concealed weapon in Cleveland, Ohio.86 The officer testified that he 
observed the defendants slowly pacing along several storefronts. This mid-
afternoon “casual and oft-repeated reconnaissance of the store window” elicited 
suspicion by the officer who confronted the men.87 Upon patting the defendants’ 
outer clothing, the officer discovered a revolver.88
The Supreme Court affirmed the state appeals court in distinguishing 
between an investigatory stop and an arrest,
   
89 and between a weapons frisk and 
a full-blown evidentiary search.90 The Supreme Court was at pains to stress that 
it was not retreating from its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence requiring police 
to “obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the war-
rant procedure.”91
  
83 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) (holding that evidence obtained in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment may not be used as evidence in criminal proceedings).  
 Thus, the Fourth Amendment did apply to “stop and frisk” 
84 392 U.S. 1 (1968).  
85 Id. at 10–11.  
86 Id. at 4–5.  
87 Id. at 6.  
88 Id. at 7. 
89 See State v. Terry, 214 N.E.2d 114, 119 (Ohio Ct. App. 1966) (noting that “[t]o constitute 
an ‘arrest,’ four requisites are involved: A purpose to take the person into custody of the law; 
under real or pretended authority and an actual or constructive seizure of detention of his person, 
so understood by the person arrested.” (quoting State ex rel. Sadler v. District Court, 225 P. 1000, 
1001–02 (Mont. 1924))). 
90 Id. at 120.  The appellate court noted that: 
We must be careful to distinguish that the “frisk” authorized herein includes 
only a “frisk” for a dangerous weapon. It by no means authorizes a search for 
contraband, evidentiary material, or anything else in the absence of reasonable 
grounds to arrest. Such a search is controlled by the requirements of the 
Fourth Amendment, and probable cause is essential. 
Id. (internal citations omitted).  
91 Terry, 392 U.S. at 20. The Court positively cited its previous holdings: Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964), and Chapman v. United States, 
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searches.92 However, the traditional standard of probable cause applicable to 
searches did not apply; rather, the Court looked to the “reasonableness” of the 
officer’s actions in light of the circumstances.93
The Supreme Court, in determining reasonableness, balanced the inva-
sion of personal privacy that the search entails against an officer’s need to detect 
for weapons.
   
94 The Court found, on balance, the interest in “effective law en-
forcement” outweighed the “minor inconvenience and petty indignity” of a stop 
and frisk search,95 with the caveat that a weapons search “be strictly circum-
scribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation.”96 That is to say, the search 
“must be limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons.”97
Educational institutions have also presented a petri dish for cultivating 
special needs exceptions. New Jersey v. T.L.O.
 
Presumably a search that went beyond the scope of where weapons might be 
concealed would be unconstitutional absent probable cause.     
98 involved the constitutionality 
of a school official’s search of a student’s purse.99 After a high school freshman 
was discovered smoking in a bathroom, her purse was searched and drug para-
phernalia and a small amount of marijuana was discovered.100 The student was 
charged with illegally possessing marijuana with the intent to distribute.101  
Building upon the balancing of interests outlined in Terry, the New Jersey court 
concluded that the search was reasonable under the circumstances in light of the 
need to preserve school discipline and order.102
  
365 U.S. 610 (1961) for the notion that it was not seeking to reign in the warrant requirement of 
the Fourth Amendment. Id.  
 
92 Id. at 19.  
93 Id. (noting that the “central inquiry under the Fourth Amendment—[is] the reasonableness 
in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security”). 
94 Id. at 21. The Court held that: 
In order to assess the reasonableness of Officer McFadden's conduct as a gen-
eral proposition, it is necessary “first to focus upon the governmental interest 
which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon  the constitutionally pro-
tected interests of the private citizen,” for there is “no ready test for determin-
ing reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search (or seize) 
against the invasion which the search  (or seizure) entails.” 
Id. at 20–21 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534–35, 536–37 (1967)). 
95 Id. at 10–11 (quoting People v. Rivera, 201 N.E.2d 32, 36 (N.Y. 1964)). See id. at 26 (stat-
ing that”[t]he protective search for weapons . . . constitutes a brief, though far from inconsidera-
ble, intrusion upon the sanctity of the person”).  
96 Id. at 25–26 (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring)). 
97 Id. at 26. 
98 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
99 Id. at 327–32.  
100 Id. at 328.  
101 See State ex rel T.L.O., 428 A.2d 1327, 1329 (N.J. Juv. & Dom. Rel., 1980).  
102 Id. at 1333–34.  
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The Supreme Court agreed; a Terry construction of the Fourth Amend-
ment governed searches of students by school officials.103 The Court acknowl-
edged that the Fourth Amendment protects students’ privacy vis-à-vis school 
officials.104 Yet, a schoolchild’s “legitimate” expectation of privacy is weighed 
against the school’s need to maintain an environment in which learning can take 
place.105 The Court found the warrant requirement unsuitable in a school setting, 
which required “some easing of the restrictions to which searches by public 
authorities are ordinarily subject . . . as well as a modification of the level of 
suspicion . . . needed to justify a search.”106 Because the probable cause re-
quirement would likely “frustrate the governmental purpose behind the 
search,”107 only a showing of reasonableness was required.108 The Supreme 
Court articulated a two-part test derived from Terry: (1) the action had to be 
“justified at its inception,”109 and (2) the search had to be “reasonably related in 
scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.”110
Interestingly, the Court in T.L.O., as it did in Terry, relied on Camara v. 
Municipal Court of San Francisco
  
Only then was a search based on a suspicion less than probable cause justified 
under the Fourth Amendment. 
111 for justifying that the reasonableness stan-
dard attach to searches under certain circumstances. Yet, in Camara, the Su-
preme Court held that a warrant based on probable cause was needed prior to an 
inspector conducting an examination of a private residence.112
  
103 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341. The Court noted that:  
 Arguments that 
the routine, safeguard-laden inspections were not intrusive and that a warrant 
requirement would hinder the progress and purpose of the inspections “unduly 
In a number of cases [it had] recognized the legality of searches and seizures 
based on suspicions that, although “reasonable,” do not rise to the level of 
probable cause . . . . Where a careful balancing of  governmental and private 
interests suggests that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amend-
ment  standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause, we have 
not hesitated to adopt such a standard. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
104 Id. at 334. Justice White, speaking for the majority, rejected the notion that because school 
administrators act in loco parentis “their authority is that of the parent, not the State, and is there-
fore not subject to the limits of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 336 (citing R.C.M. v. State, 660 
S.W.2d 552 (Tex. App. 1983)). 
105 Id. at 339–40.   
106 Id. at 340. 
107 Id. (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532–33 (1967)). 
108 Id. at 341.  
109 Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).  
110 Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)). 
111 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
112 Id. at 540.  
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discount[ed]” the purpose of the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.113
The Supreme Court subsequently upheld the authority of a school dis-
trict to require suspicion-less drug tests for students participating in extracurri-
cular programs. In both Board of Education v. Earls
 
Yet, those arguments rejected in cases of health and safety inspections were 
later accepted in the case of officer protection and school discipline.   
114 and Vernonia School 
District 47J v. Acton,115 the Supreme Court found that the interest of deterring 
drug use by students outweighed the intrusion of a urine-based drug test.116  
Based on the rationale of T.L.O., the Court evermore stressed the context of the 
search as dispositive of its constitutionality.117 The Supreme Court looked to 
other non-school special needs exceptions indicating that the doctrine had great-
er implications than the confines of T.L.O.118 The Court also signaled that the 
probable cause standard was applicable primarily to the narrow context of crim-
inal law.119 Where an “administrative search” is prophylactic, the probable 
cause standard may be ill suited to determine the reasonableness of the 
search.120
  
113 Id. at 531–32. 
   
114 536 U.S. 822 (2002). 
115 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
116 Earls, 536 U.S. at 838; Acton, 515 U.S. at 664–65. 
117 In Acton, Justice Scalia noted: 
Legitimate privacy expectations are even less with regard to student athletes. 
School sports are not for the  bashful. They require “suiting up” before each 
practice or event, and showering and changing afterwards. Public school lock-
er rooms, the usual sites for these activities, are not notable for the privacy 
they  afford. . . . By choosing to “go out for the team,” [students] voluntarily 
subject themselves to a degree of regulation even higher than that imposed on 
students generally. . . . Somewhat like adults who choose to participate in a 
“closely regulated industry,” students who voluntarily participate in school 
athletics have reason to expect intrusions upon normal rights and privileges, 
including privacy. 
515 U.S. at 657. Yet in Earls, the Supreme Court found that students participating in voluntary, 
non-athletic activities also subjected themselves to a lesser expectation of privacy. 536 U.S. at 
831–32. Cf. id. at 845 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (stating that extracurricular activities are “part of 
the school’s educational program” and that “[p]articipation in such activities is a key component 
of school life, essential in reality for students applying to college, and, for all participants, a signif-
icant contributor to the breadth and quality of the educational experience”). 
118 The Supreme Court in Acton cited four examples: National Treasury Employees Union v. 
Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (upholding a policy of random drug testing of federal customs 
officers); Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (upholding police 
checkpoints targeting drunk drivers); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (upholding 
checkpoints searching for illegal immigrants); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 
U.S. 602 (1989) (upholding random drug testing of railroad employees). 515 U.S. at 653–54. 
119 Earls, 536 U.S. at 828.  
120 Id. The Court noted that “[i]n certain limited circumstances, the Government’s need to dis-
cover such latent or hidden conditions, or to prevent their development, is sufficiently compelling 
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The Supreme Court further distinguished constitutional standards of 
drug testing policies designed to limit involvement and those designed purely to 
affect an arrest by law enforcement. In Ferguson v. City of Charleston,121 the 
Medical University of South Carolina (“MUSC”) had enacted a policy of testing 
pregnant patients for cocaine and then alerting police of positive tests.122 The 
policy—Policy M-7—provided that pregnant patients would be given a warrant-
less drug test without their consent if they met one or more of a set of criteria 
with regard to their pregnancy.123 If the patient tested positive for cocaine before 
or after labor, police were notified, and the woman would be subject to prosecu-
tion for criminal offenses ranging from possession to child neglect.124
It was not asserted that the nine factors under which a patient could be 
tested for cocaine gave rise to reasonable suspicion or probable cause.
   
125 The 
Supreme Court distinguished previous cases in which it upheld warrantless drug 
testing.126 Inherent to a patient’s expectation of privacy in a hospital setting was 
that his or her diagnostic tests were private and not disclosed to third parties or 
law enforcement without consent.127 More fundamental was the nature of the 
special need. Previous special needs exceptions were upheld when their “justifi-
cation for the absence of a warrant or individualized suspicion was one divorced 
from the State's general interest in law enforcement.”128 The critical component 
of Policy M-7 was the “use of law enforcement to coerce the patients into sub-
stance abuse treatment.”129 The operation of the policy was “ultimately indistin-
guishable from the general interest in crime control.”130
  
to justify the intrusion on privacy entailed by conducting such searches without any measure of 
individualized suspicion.” Id. at 829 (citing Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668). 
 As such, it ran afoul of 
the Fourth Amendment.   
121 532 U.S. 67 (2001). 
122 Id. at 69–72.  
123 Id. at 71 n.4 (noting that under Policy M-7, pregnant women would be given a drug test if 
they had: “1) No prenatal care, 2) Late prenatal care after 24 weeks gestation, 3) Incomplete pre-
natal care, 4) Abruptio placentae, 5) Intrauterine fetal death, 6) Preterm labor ‘of no obvious 
cause’, 7) IUGR [intrauterine growth retardation] ‘of no obvious cause’, 8) Previously known 
drug or alcohol abuse, 9) Unexplained congenital anomalies”).  
124 Id. at 72–73. 
125 Id. at 76–77. 
126 Id. at 77–78. 
127 Id. at 78.  
128 Id. at 79, 80 n.17 (stating that the special needs exception “as used in Skinner and Von Raab 
. . . was used to describe a basis for a search apart from the regular needs of law enforcement”).  
129 Id. at 80.  
130 Id. at 81 (quoting Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000)). 
File: Baldwin and Koslosky Created on:  12/2/2011 3:34:00 PM Last Printed: 12/6/2011 12:15:00 PM 
688 WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 114 
2. Prosecuting “Willful Blindness” 
The development of willful blindness jurisprudence has made it easier 
to sustain criminal convictions, as illustrated by the case of Ellen Campbell.  
Ellen Campbell was a real estate agent in Mooresville, North Carolina.131 Over 
the course of a few weeks she had showed several upscale houses to Mark Law-
ing, a gaudy, soon-to-be-indicted drug trafficker posing as a businessman.132  
Lawing eventually decided to purchase a home priced at $182,500.133 Unable to 
secure a loan in light of his criminal activities, Lawing paid $60,000 in undis-
closed cash, through Ms. Campbell, to the home seller in return for a lower sell-
ing price of an equivalent amount.134 Ms. Campbell was convicted of, inter alia, 
money laundering and engaging in a transaction involving criminally derived 
property despite not having the explicit knowledge of Lawing’s criminal activi-
ties.135
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.
  
136 Al-
though it acknowledged that the money laundering statute required actual sub-
jective knowledge on the part of the defendant,137 the appeals court assessed 
whether Ms. Campbell was willfully blind to the nature of the transaction.138 
The physical appearance and conduct of Mr. Lawing was sufficient, according 
to the court, so that a “reasonable jury could have found that Campbell was will-
fully blind to the fact that Lawing was a drug dealer and the . . . property was 
intended, at least in part, to conceal the proceeds of Lawing's drug selling opera-
tion.”139
  
131 United States v. Campbell (Campbell I), 777 F. Supp. 1259, 1260–61 (W.D. N.C. 1991).  
 
132 Id. at 1261. The trial court gave significant note to Mr. Lawing’s lifestyle, how he often 
arrived gold-clad in one of two Porsches, and on one occasion brought $20,000 in cash to a home 
viewing to demonstrate he had the financial means to purchase an upscale lake home. Id.  
133 Id. 
134 Id.  
135 Id. at 1260.  The money laundering statute reads as follows:  
Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction 
represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts or at-
tempts to conduct such a financial transaction which in fact involves the 
proceeds of specified unlawful activity . . . knowing that the transaction is de-
signed in whole or in part . . . to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, 
the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful 
activity. . . . 
18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) (2006). See also 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a) (2006) (making it a crime to 
“knowingly engage[] or attempt[] to engage in a monetary transaction in criminally derived prop-
erty of a value greater than $10,000”).  
136 United States v. Campbell (Campbell II), 977 F.2d 854, 855 (1992).  
137 Id. at 857. 
138 Id.  
139 Id. at 859. 
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The doctrine of willful blindness, or as it may be termed, “deliberate ig-
norance” or “conscious avoidance,” is not new. Willful blindness was incorpo-
rated into the first draft of the Model Penal Code and exists there still.140 Differ-
ent courts have articulated various rationales for the doctrine.141 Willful blind-
ness requires juries to deduce the subjective knowledge of the defendant rather 
than weigh what a reasonable person under the defendant’s circumstances 
would do.142 The Supreme Court has held that “reasonable inferences from evi-
dence of defendant's conduct” can be drawn to “find the requisite knowledge on 
defendant’s part.”143
Willful blindness prosecutions often permit an inconsistent introduction 
of evidence that may otherwise have been barred as extrinsic to the crime 
charged.
 Jurisdictions are varied on how loose or tight they are re-
garding what information the jury may use to infer guilt. Thus, prosecutions 
resting on a theory of willful blindness risk doctrinal overbreath and an incon-
sistent application of justice. Moreover, prosecutions of conspiracy also risk 
forum shopping between various district and circuit courts based on the ease 
with which criminal evidence may be introduced.   
144 For instance in United States v. Freeman,145 the Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit affirmed a conviction of, inter alia, twenty-two counts of mon-
ey laundering and one count of conspiracy involving a Ponzi scheme.146
  
140 The relevant section of the Model Penal Code reads: “When knowledge of the existence of a 
particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a 
high probability of its existence, unless he actually believes that it does not exist.” MODEL PENAL 
CODE § 2.02(7) (1981). See United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 701 n.9 (9th Cir. 1976) (dis-
cussing MODEL PENAL CODE § 129-30 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955)). The Supreme Court has 
applied the language of Model Penal Code § 2.02(7) to various criminal statutes. See Barnes v. 
United States, 412 U.S. 837, 845 n.10 (1973); Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 416 n.29 
(1970); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 46 n.93 (1969). 
  The 
defendants comingled funds derived from selling $17 million in bogus “private 
141 See, e.g., United States v. Adeniji, 31 F.3d 58, 62 (2d Cir. 1994) (“The rationale for the 
conscious avoidance doctrine is that ‘a defendant’s affirmative efforts to ‘see no evil’ and ‘hear no 
evil’ do not somehow magically invest him with the ability to ‘do no evil.’’”) (quoting United 
States v. DiTommaso, 817 F.2d 201, 218 n.26 (2d Cir. 1987)); United States v. Ramsey, 785 F.2d 
184, 189 (7th Cir.1986) (stating that “actual knowledge and deliberate avoidance of knowledge 
are the same thing”); Jewell, 532 F.2d at 700 (opining that the “substantive justification for the 
rule is that deliberate ignorance and positive knowledge are equally culpable”). 
142 See United States v. Khorozian, 333 F.3d 498, 508 (3d Cir. 2003) (willful blindness instruc-
tions are proper when the defendant was “subjectively aware of the high probability of the fact in 
question, and not merely that a reasonable man would have been aware of the probability”); Unit-
ed States v. Caminos, 770 F.2d 361, 365 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that “the judge’s version of the 
‘deliberate ignorance’ instruction must make clear that the defendant himself was subjectively 
aware of the high probability of the fact in question, and not merely that a reasonable man would 
have been aware of the probability”).   
143 Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 149 n.19 (1994). See also Spies v. United States, 317 
U.S. 492, 499–500 (1943). 
144 See FED. R. EVID. 403(a)–(b), 404(a)–(b).  
145 434 F.3d 369 (5th Cir. 2005).  
146 Id. at 372–73, 382.  
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placement secured trading programs” and “insulin contracts” investments.147 On 
appeal, the defendants argued that the trial court erred in introducing testimony 
regarding the “insulin contracts” Ponzi as it was not intrinsic to the charged of-
fenses contained in the indictment.148 The Fifth Circuit rejected the contention 
that the evidence of the second Ponzi scheme was inadmissible as extrinsic.149 
The court noted that even though the evidence introduced was of acts other than 
those related to the offense, it was intrinsic “when the evidence of the other act 
and the evidence of the crime charged are ‘inextricably intertwined’ or both acts 
are part of a ‘single criminal episode’ or the other acts were ‘necessary prelimi-
naries’ to the crime charged.”150
The court also upheld the willful blindness jury instruction because a 
“proper factual basis” for the jury instruction was established at trial.
 
151 Such a 
proper factual basis exists if the “record supports inferences that ‘(1) the defen-
dant was subjectively aware of a high probability of the existence of illegal con-
duct; and (2) the defendant purposely contrived to avoid learning of the illegal 
conduct.’”152 Indeed, the court noted that the “wealth of evidence” presented at 
trial supported an inference that the defendant subjectively knew that he was 
involved in illicit activity.153 It did not matter that the prosecution proceeded on 
a theory of actual knowledge over the course of the trial.154 The Fifth Circuit 
noted that “deliberate indifference instruction is not inconsistent with evidence 
of actual knowledge.”155
Other courts of appeal have varied as to when a deliberate indifference 
jury instruction is appropriate. The Second Circuit permits a “conscious avoid-
ance” jury instruction if (1) “the defendant asserts the lack of some specific as-
pect of knowledge required for conviction,” and (2) “‘the evidence is such that a 
rational juror may reach [the] conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt . . . that 
[the defendant] was aware of a high probability [of the fact in dispute] and con-
sciously avoided confirming that fact.’”
 
156 The Eighth Circuit, by contrast, per-
mits such a jury instruction where the defendant “asserts a lack of guilty know-
ledge, but the evidence supports an inference of deliberate ignorance.”157
  
147 Id. at 373–74.  
 Simi-
148 Id. at 374. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. (quoting United States v. Williams, 900 F.2d 823, 825 (5th Cir. 1990) (internal citations 
omitted)).  
151 Id. at 378. 
152 Id. (quoting United States v. Scott, 159 F.3d 916, 922 (5th Cir. 1998)). 
153 Id.  
154 Id.  
155 Id. at 379.   
156 United States v. Ferrarini, 219 F.3d 145, 154 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Ro-
driguez, 983 F.2d 455, 458 (2d Cir. 1993)). 
157 United States v. Sdoulam, 398 F.3d 981, 993 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Hil-
debrand, 152 F.3d 756, 764 (8th Cir. 1998)). 
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larly, the Tenth Circuit permits a willful blindness jury instruction “when the 
prosecution presents evidence that the defendant purposely contrived to avoid 
learning all the facts in order to have a defense in the event of a subsequent 
prosecution.”158 A panel of the Ninth Circuit articulated a relatively high stan-
dard permitting a jury instruction only when “specific evidence” is presented 
that the defendant “‘(1) actually suspected that he or she might be involved in 
criminal activity, (2) deliberately avoided taking steps to confirm or deny those 
suspicions, and (3) did so in order to provide himself or herself with a defense in 
the event of prosecution.’”159
Perhaps the root of the inconsistency is that federal courts have articu-
lated varying conceptualizations of what constitutes willful blindness. Some 
courts have seen willful blindness as a function of probability. A willful blind-
ness instruction is appropriate “where the defendant ‘suspects a fact, realizes its 
probability, but refrains from obtaining final confirmation in order to be able to 
deny knowledge if apprehended.’”
 
160 Other courts have viewed willful blindness 
as an actual theory of knowledge that satisfies the scienter requirement of a 
criminal offense.161
  
158 United States v. Espinoza, 244 F.3d 1234, 1242 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Hanzli-
cek, 187 F.3d 1228, 1233 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 What is certain, however, is that the development and proli-
feration of willful blindness prosecutions has made it easier to sustain criminal 
convictions where the circumstances surrounding the alleged conduct give rise 
to an increased suspicion of guilt where the underlying conduct does not support 
a conviction based on the mens rea requirement of the offense.   
159 United States v. Heredia, 429 F.3d 820, 824–25 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. 
Baron, 94 F.3d 1312, 1318 n.3 (9th Cir. 1996)), overruled by United States v. Heredia, 483 F.3d 
913, 920 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (holding that the “deliberately avoided” element of the two-
pronged jury instruction is sufficient that the Baron three-pronged jury instruction that included 
motive is discarded). 
160 See Heredia, 429 F.3d at 824 (quoting United States v. Mapelli, 971 F.2d 284, 286 (9th Cir. 
1992)). See also United States v. Barnhart, 979 F.2d 647, 651–52 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating that a 
jury instruction “should not be given unless there is evidence to ‘support the inference that the 
defendant was aware of a high probability of the existence of the fact in question and purposely 
contrived to avoid learning all of the facts in order to have a defense in the event of a subsequent 
prosecution’”) (quoting United States v. Alvarado, 838 F.2d 311, 314 (9th Cir. 1987)); United 
States v. Ramsey, 785 F.2d 184, 190 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that the trial court properly in-
structed the jury that actual knowledge and deliberate avoidance of knowledge are the same). 
161 See United States v. Brodie, 403 F.3d 123, 148 (3d Cir. 2005) (applying the “willful blind-
ness theory of knowledge”); United States v. Wert-Ruiz, 228 F.3d 250, 255 (3d Cir. 2000) (hold-
ing willful blindness to be a “subjective state of mind that is deemed to satisfy the scienter re-
quirement of knowledge”) (quoting United States v. One 1973 Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d 794, 808 (3d 
Cir. 1994)). 
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3. Pre-September 11 Statutory Responses  
Times of war or national crisis precipitate the need—or the perception 
of need—for more stringent law enforcement measures.162 Political pressure 
makes elected officials eager to demonstrate their commitment and competency 
in handling or responding to a threat. As was the case with their British counter-
parts with the 1974 Prevention of Terrorism Act and its progeny, the American 
Congress has not hesitated to legislate stricter law enforcement measures in re-
sponse to a terrorist incident. One example is the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”).163
In 1994, Representative Don Edwards successfully added a small provi-
sion to the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.
   
164 The 
rider required that “investigation[s] may not be initiated or continued . . . based 
on activities protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution, including 
expressions of support or provision of financial support for the nonviolent polit-
ical, religious, philosophical or ideological goals or beliefs of any person or 
group.”165 The prohibition, however, was to have a short life.  In April 1995, a 
large truck bomb detonated outside the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma 
City, killing 168 people. As a result of that incident and the impending Presiden-
tial election cycle, the AEDPA was signed into law by President Clinton.166
The 1996 Act expressly revoked the Edwards Amendment and allowed 
“guilt by association” to re-enter the national security discourse of the United 
States.
 
167 Under the AEDPA, the Secretary of State could designate any group 
as terrorist168 even though that group engaged in both lawful and unlawful activ-
ities.169
  
162 See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text.    
 Providing any “material support” to any organization designated as en-
163 AEDPA of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. 
164 Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2022 (1994). For a background of the Act see DAVID COLE & 
JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION: SACRIFICING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE 
NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY 102–05 (The New Press 3d ed. 2006). 
165 Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2022 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(c)(2) 
(2000), amended by AEPDA § 323).  
166 COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 164, at 131–32. 
167 See AEDPA § 323 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2006)); McCarran-Walter Act, Pub. L. 
108-198, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (adding Communism to the list of ideologies that could make an 
immigrant deportable and excludable). The McCarran-Walter Act was declared unconstitutional 
in 1989 by the District Court for the Central District of California. See Am.-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Comm. v. Meese, 714 F. Supp. 1060, 1084 (C.D. Cal. 1989), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part sub nom., Am-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Thornburgh, 940 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 
1991), opinion amended and superseded on denial of reh’g, 970 F.2d 501 (9th Cir. 1991) aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part sub nom. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Thornburgh, 970 F.2d 501 
(9th Cir. 1991); see generally David Cole, Secrecy, Guilt by Association, and the Terrorist Pro-
file, 15 J. L. & RELIGION 267 (2001) (arguing that the use of secret procedures and guilt by associ-
ation in immigration trials is unconstitutional and counterproductive).  
168 AEDPA § 302(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a) (2000). 
169 COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 164, at 139–42. 
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gaged in terrorist activities became a criminal offense.170 Moreover, financial 
institutions possessing funds of a suspect organization are obligated to report 
their existence.171
Thirty organizations were originally designated by the Secretary of 
State as terrorist.  Two of the organizations were the Kurdistan Workers’ Party 
(“PKK”) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (“LTTE”). Two American 
citizens, one an administrative law judge, formed the Humanitarian Law Project 
(“HLP”), a non-profit organization “dedicated to furthering international com-
pliance with humanitarian law and human rights law and the peaceful resolution 
of armed conflicts.”
 The power of the Secretary of State pursuant to the AEDPA is 
functionally equivalent to the proscription provisions in the original 1974 Pre-
vention of Terrorism Act and its progeny. Groups are targeted because of their 
ideological orientation and the geopolitical disposition of their respective gov-
ernments.  
172 HLP was given consultative status with the United Na-
tions and sought to assist the PKK in revealing humanitarian abuses on the Kur-
dish people in Eastern Turkey.173
The AEDPA effectively precluded the HLP from supporting the PKK, 
which led to a constitutional challenge of the legislation.  In Humanitarian Law 
Project v. Reno (HLP II),
  
174 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that 
the AEDPA did not violate the First Amendment protection of freedom of asso-
ciation.175  The court stated that the AEDPA did not curtail the expressive con-
duct of those who affiliated with the HLP, but rather was aimed at preventing 
terrorism.176 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit held that strict scrutiny was inap-
propriate.177 Moreover, the circuit court held that the AEDPA did not grant the 
Secretary of State “unfettered discretion” to limit the association with certain 
organizations.178
  
170 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2006). This section provides “[w]hoever knowingly provides 
material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both . . . .” Id. (emphasis 
added). “Material support” is broadly defined as “currency . . . or other financial securities, finan-
cial services, lodging, training, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications 
equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel . . . , transportation, . . .  
except medicine or religious materials.” § 2339A(b). 
 The plaintiffs in the case argued that the Secretary of State’s 
171 § 2339B(a)(2)(A)–(B), (b). The civil penalty for non-compliance is the greater of $50,000 or 
twice the value of the amount the financial institution was required to report. § 2339B(b)(A)–(B).  
172 Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno (HLP I), 9 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1181 (C.D. Cal. 1998). 
173 HLP sought to do this by (1) soliciting funds, (2) advocating on behalf of the PKK in the US 
Congress, (3) training PKK members how to seek redress for violations of humanitarian law, (4) 
advocating on behalf of political prisoners, (5) holding press conferences, and (6) providing lodg-
ing for PKK visitors. Id. at 1182. 
174 205 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).  
175 Id. at 1138. 
176 Id. at 1135. 
177 Id.   
178 Id. at 1137.  
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decision was effectively unreviewable.179  The court held that there was, at least 
formally, review of the decision in the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia.180 The likelihood of success was not a great concern for the court be-
cause deference to the executive branch is “a necessary concomitant of the for-
eign affairs power.”181
What is perhaps most significant, however, is that the AEDPA greatly 
restricted habeas corpus claims.  Called “the most celebrated writ in English 
law,”
  
182 habeas corpus predates the Constitution as a component of colonial law. 
Habeas corpus was prominently featured in the discussions of the delegates at 
the Constitutional Convention.183 Ultimately, the writ would be codified in Ar-
ticle I of the Constitution184 and section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789.185
The procedural requirements of habeas corpus review were significantly 
increased by the AEDPA. Existing constitutional jurisprudence was modified by 
the Act; the deference usually afforded to state court application of facts was 
dramatically increased via statute. In Brown v. Allen,
   
186 the Supreme Court con-
sidered the effect of a denial of certiorari to review a state supreme court deci-
sion upholding a criminal conviction on a habeas corpus petition to a federal 
district court.187
  
179 Id.  
 The Court turned to the status of the facts as determined by a 
state court in a subsequent habeas petition after affirming that a denial of certi-
180 Id.; see 8 U.S.C. § 1189(c). 
181 HLP II, 205 F.3d at 1137. 
182 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,  COMMENTARIES 129 (1791). 
183 Max Rosenn, The Great Writ—A Reflection of Social Change, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 337, 339 
(1983). 
184 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be sus-
pended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”).  
185 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81. Section 14 also provided that  
either of the justices of the supreme court, as well as judges of the district 
courts, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of an 
inquiry into the cause of commitment.—Provided, That writs of habeas cor-
pus shall in no case extend to prisoners in gaol, unless where they are in cus-
tody, under or by colour of the authority of the United States, or are commit-
ted for trial before some court of the same, or are necessary to be brought into 
court to testify.  
Id. at 82 (emphasis in original). 
186 344 U.S. 443 (1953), abrogated by Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312–13 (1963), over-
ruled by Keeney v. Tamayo-Res, 504 U.S. 1, 4 (1992), superseded by statute 28 U.S.C. § 
2254(e)(2) as amended by the AEDPA, as recognized in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 434 
(2000) (“the opening clause of § 2254(e)(2) codifies Keeney’s threshold standard of diligence, so 
that prisoners who would have had to satisfy Keeney’s test for excusing the deficiency in the state-
court record prior to the AEDPA are now controlled by § 2254(e)(2)”). 
187 Id. at 446–47.  
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orari “‘imports no expression of opinion upon the merits of a case.’”188 Justice 
Reed’s opinion stated that “[w]here the record of the application affords an ade-
quate opportunity to weigh the sufficiency of the allegations and the evidence, 
and no unusual circumstances calling for a hearing are presented, a repetition of 
trial is not required.”189 Thus, if no “vital flaw [is] found in the process of ascer-
taining such facts in the State court,” a district court may accept them in a sub-
sequent habeas petition.190
Yet the AEDPA added a requirement that state court factual determina-
tions “shall be presumed to be correct.”
   
191  The habeas petitioner “shall have the 
burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evi-
dence.”192 Federal courts can only hold an evidentiary hearing if two criteria are 
satisfied.193  First, the petitioner must demonstrate “that the claim relies on a 
new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by 
the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or . . . a factual predicate 
that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due dili-
gence.”194 The petitioner must then prove that “the facts underlying the claim . . 
. would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for 
constitutional error, no reasonable fact finder would have found the applicant 
guilty of the underlying offense.”195
The AEDPA also significantly curtails the ability of petitioners to bring 
multiple habeas claims. Prior to 1996, it was significantly easier for criminal 
defendants to file subsequent habeas claims. The Warren Court held that a sub-
sequent habeas petition could only be denied under three conditions. First, “the 
same ground presented in the subsequent application was determined adversely 
to the applicant on the prior application.”
 
196
  
188 Id. at 456 (quoting House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42, 48 (1945)); Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. 
Wolf Bros. & Co., 240 U.S. 251, 258 (1916) (stating that “this is a jurisdiction to be exercised 
sparingly, and only in cases of peculiar gravity and general importance, or in order to secure un-
iformity of decision.”).  
 Second, the previous denial of ha-
189 Id. at 463. 
190 Daniels v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 506 (1953) abrogated by Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 
312–13 (1963), overruled by Keeney v. Tamayo-Res, 504 U.S. 1, 4 (1992), superseded by statute 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) as amended by the AEDPA, as recognized in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 
420, 434 (2000) (“the opening clause of § 2254(e)(2) codifies Keeney’s threshold standard of 
diligence, so that prisoners who would have had to satisfy Keeney’s test for excusing the deficien-
cy in the state-court record prior to the AEDPA are now controlled by § 2254(e)(2)”).  The Su-
preme Court noted that a state court’s factual determinations “may have been made after hearing 
witnesses perhaps no longer available or whose recollection later may have been affected by the 
passage of time or by the fact that one judicial determination has already been made.” Id.  
191 AEDPA § 104(4), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (2006). 
192 Id.  
193 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A) (2006). 
194 § 2244(b)(2)(A)–(B)(i).  
195 § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii). 
196 Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 15 (1963).  
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beas relief “must have rested on an adjudication of the merits of the ground pre-
sented in the subsequent application.”197 Third, “the ends of justice would not be 
served by reaching the merits of the subsequent application.”198
The Supreme Court increased the standard by which a successive ha-
beas claim would be permitted. The Supreme Court considered the applicability 
and standard of the abuse of the writ doctrine—the circumstances under which 
an issue is raised for the first time in a second petition—to habeas claims in 
McCleskey v. Zant.
   
199 The Supreme Court held that for a criminal defendant to 
assert a subsequent claim, he or she must first show cause, that is “‘some objec-
tive factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to raise the claim in 
state court.’”200 Second, the petitioner must demonstrate that “‘actual preju-
dice’” resulted from the errors raised in the habeas petition.201
Yet the AEDPA increased the requirements that a petitioner must meet 
prior to having a federal court hear a subsequent habeas claim. First, a petitioner 
has only one year to file for habeas relief from a state court judgment.
    
202 This 
limitation is further reduced in capital cases where a defendant is deemed to 
have been provided adequate representation in collateral proceedings.203 The 
Act also provided that “[b]efore a second or successive application . . . is filed in 
the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for 
an order authorizing the district court to consider the application.”204 The peti-
tioner must make a prima facie case that his or her case comports with the in-
creased standards of habeas review.205 In addition to the presumption of factual 
validity, relief is available only when a state court judgment is “contrary to, or 
involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as de-
termined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”206
  
197 Id. at 16.  
 Relief is unavailable on 
198 Id. at 15.  
199 499 U.S. 467, 470 (1991).  
200 Id. at 493 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)). The Supreme Court elabo-
rated that “objective factors” that meet the threshold of cause include “‘interference by officials’ 
that makes compliance with the state's procedural rule impracticable, and ‘a showing that the 
factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel.’ . . . In addition, consti-
tutionally ‘ineffective assistance of counsel . . . is cause.’” Id. at 493–94 (quoting Murray, 477 
U.S. at 486–88 (internal citations omitted)).  
201 Id. at 494 (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 168 (1982)).  
202 AEDPA § 101, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2006).  
203 AEDPA § 107(a), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261–2263 (2006). Such applicant has 180 days to file a 
petition. Id.    
204 AEDPA § 106(b), 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A) (2006). See also Felker v. Turpin 518 U.S. 
651, 664 (1996) (upholding the requirement that a habeas petitioner obtain leave from a circuit 
court of appeals prior to filing a second habeas petition).   
205 AEDPA § 106(b), 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(C) (2006). 
206 AEDPA § 104(3), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006). See also Horn v. Banks, 536 U.S. 266, 
273 (2002) (per curiam) (holding that Teague determination, assessing the retroactivity of a new 
constitutional principle asserted in a habeas petition, is required under AEDPA); Teague v. Lane, 
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the ground that a state court misapplied constitutional principles to the specific 
facts of a case.207
III. LAW, FINANCIAL CRIMES, AND THE “WAR ON TERROR” 
   
Both the AEDPA and the criminalization policy in Northern Ireland 
highlight the unique ability of emergency legislation to seep into and alter ordi-
nary law, be it civil or criminal. On September 11, 2001, approximately 3,000 
individuals died as a result of the worst terrorist attack on American soil. Inqui-
ries into the causes, nature, and future prevention of terrorism focused, in large 
part, on the financing of terrorist operations. It was estimated that the September 
11 attacks were financed by between $400,000 and $500,000.208
On September 28, 2001, the United Nations Security Council adopted 
Resolution 1373.
 This relatively 
small amount of funding required to produce a massively devastating attack 
became a chief concern of foreign, domestic, and international policymakers.   
209 The chief operational goal of Resolution 1373 was to 
“[p]revent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts.”210
  
489 U.S. 288, 310–13 (1989) (requiring that a new principle of constitutional law, which petition-
er asserts, be applicable retroactively), superseded by statute, AEDPA of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
132, 110 Stat. 1214, as recognized in Morris v. Reynolds, 264 F.3d 38, 46 n.7 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(noting that “[p]rior to the passage of the AEDPA . . . Teague and its subsequent decisions dic-
tated that when a prisoner sought federal habeas corpus relief based upon a principle announced 
after a final judgment, federal courts were required to look at whether the state court’s decision 
relied on an ‘old rule’ . . . or whether it imposed a ‘new rule.’”).  
 The resolution di-
207 AEDPA § 104(3), codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2006).  Section 2254(d) provides 
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody 
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to 
any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless 
the adjudication of the claim— 
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 
Court of the United States; or  
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of 
the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.  
§ 2254(d)(1)–(2). 
208 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, COMPLETE 9/11 
COMMISSION REPORT 172 (2004). Similarly, relatively small amounts of funding were required to 
support terrorist operations in Northern Ireland. The yearly operating budgets for the IRA and 
Ulster Volunteer Force were £1.5 million and £1-2 million respectively. SELECT COMMITTEE ON 
NORTHERN IRELAND AFFAIRS, THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM IN NORTHERN IRELAND, FOURTH 
REPORT OF SESSION (H.C. 978-I, 2002) tbl. 1 at 18, available at http://www.parliament.the-
stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/cmniaf/978/978.pdf. Smaller paramilitary group 
such as the Ulster Freedom Fighters and Ulster Defense Association had annual operating costs of 
£250,000 and £500,000 respectively. Id.  
209 S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001), available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/557/43/PDF/N0155743.pdf?OpenElement. 
210 Id. at art. 1(a). 
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rected states to “[c]riminalize the wilful [sic] provision or collection . . . of funds 
by their nationals or in their territories with the intention that the funds should 
be used, or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in order to carry out terror-
ist acts.”211 States were also to freeze funds used for acts of terrorism and to 
prevent funds from being made available to individuals involved in terrorism.212  
The British response to Resolution 1373 was the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and 
Security Act of 2001;213 the United States responded with the USA PATRIOT 
Act.214
A. Traditional Notions of Bank Secrecy 
   
The American legislative experience regarding bank secrecy and finan-
cial privacy has been the quest to balance the needs of customer confidentiality 
with crime prevention.215 Bank customers have traditionally been afforded an 
implicit common law right to financial privacy.216 The federal judiciary has not, 
however, recognized a legitimate expectation of privacy with regard to financial 
statements.217
American notions of financial privacy are markedly different from those 
of Europe. The roots of European bank secrecy grew out of a much stronger 
notion of necessity.
   
218 Post-WWI hyperinflation and political instability led in-
dividuals to hold assets in stable banking systems and financial markets outside 
of their home countries.219 Germany promulgated a 1933 law which stated that, 
under a penalty of death, individuals were required to report all assets held out-
side their jurisdiction of residence.220
  
211 Id. at art. 1(b). 
 As a result, Switzerland enacted the first 
modern codified bank secrecy legislation. The aftermath of WWII—economic 
212 Id. at arts. 1(c)–(d). 
213 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24 (Eng.).   
214 PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 313, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). 
215 Eric J. Gouvin, Are There Any Checks and Balances on the Government’s Power to Check  
Our Balances? The Fate of Financial Privacy in the War on Terrorism, 14 TEMP. POL. & CIV. 
RTS. L. REV. 517, 519 (2005). 
216 Id. 
217 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440–41 (1976) (stating that there is no Fourth 
Amendment protection of subpoenaed bank records), superseded by statute, Right to Financial 
Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–21, as recognized in Hancock v. Marshall, 86 F.R.D. 
209, 210 (D.D.C. 1980) (noting that the Act “permits individuals to contest Government access to 
certain records held by banks and other financial institutions . . . by requiring the Government to 
notify the bank customer of the subpoena or summons . . . . [T]he customer may file a motion to 
quash in district court.”) (internal citations omitted). 
218 See C. Todd Jones, Compulsion Over Comity: The United States’ Assault on Foreign Bank 
Secrecy, 12 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 454, 455 (1992). 
219 Id. 
220 Id.  
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devastation, social uncertainty, and high tax rates—obliged individuals again to 
seek foreign deposit locations.221
These events in large part led Europe to develop broad-based privacy 
protections. Transnational privacy protection initiatives began in 1981 with the 
Council of Europe.
 
222 With the purpose of “secur[ing] in the territory of each 
Party for every individual, whatever his nationality or residence, respect for his 
rights and fundamental freedoms, and in particular his right to privacy,”223 the 
Convention was applicable to data in “automated personal data files and auto-
matic processing of personal data in the public and private sectors.”224
The Convention was followed by the European Union’s Data Privacy 
Directive.
 The Con-
vention measured by which member states protect data contained in automated 
files. As the Convention was not self-executing, each European member state 
was to enact implementing legislation to effect its provisions.   
225 Like the Convention, the Data Privacy Directive is applicable to 
member government only after national implementing legislation is enacted.  
Unlike its predecessor, the E.U. Directive has two objectives: (1) to protect in-
dividuals’ fundamental rights of privacy, and (2) to “neither restrict nor prohibit 
the free flow of personal data between Member States.”226 The Data Privacy 
Directive outlined broad criteria for processing data,227 disclosing information to 
the “data subject,”228 ensuring confidentiality of data,229 and transferring data to 
third countries.230
The United Kingdom enacted the Data Protection Act in 1998 to give 
effect to the provision of the Data Privacy Directive.
  
231 The Act provides for an 
individual’s right to access personal data as well as criteria on the disclosure of 
personal information.232 Yet as was authorized by the Data Privacy Directive233
  
221 Id. at 456. 
 
222 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Per-
sonal Data, Council of Europe, Jan. 28, 1981, C.E.T.S. No. 108, available at 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/treaties/html/108.htm. 
223 Id. at ch. 1, art 1.   
224 Id. at ch. 1, art. 3(1).  
225 Council Directive, 95/46, Data Privacy Directive, 1995 O.J. (L 281) [hereinafter Data Priva-
cy Directive]. 
226 Id. at ch. 1, art. 1(1)–(2).   
227 Id. at ch. 2, art. 7. 
228 Id. at ch. 2, arts. 10–11. 
229 Id. at ch. 2, arts. 16–17. 
230 Id. at ch. 4, arts. 25–26. 
231 Data Protection Act, 1998, c. 29 (Eng.).  
232 Id. § 7.  See also id. § 10 (governing the disclosure of information “likely to cause damage 
or distress”); id. art. 13 (outlining compensation to unauthorized disclosure of data).  
233 Data Privacy Directive, supra note 225, ch. 2, art. 13(1)(a) (providing that “Member States 
may adopt legislative measures to restrict the scope of the obligations and rights . . . when such a 
restriction constitutes a necessary measures to safeguard . . .  national security”).  
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an exception was made for the disclosure of information in the name of national 
security.234 The exemption requires that a certificate certify that the purpose of a 
disclosure of information identified by a “general description,” was made for 
national security purposes.235 An individual “directly affected” by the disclosure 
of personal information may file an appeal to quash the certificate upon a find-
ing that the “Minister did not have reasonable grounds for issuing the certifi-
cate.”236
In contrast to the European Union, and by extension the United King-
dom, the United States has predominantly taken a sectoral approach to privacy, 
providing differentiated levels of protection to various areas of substantive 
law.
 
237 The first modern American financial privacy legislation was the Bank 
Secrecy Act.238  Passed in 1970, the Bank Secrecy Act required financial institu-
tions to keep records of their clients’ financial activities.  Specifically, financial 
institutions were required to report every transaction in excess of $10,000.239 
Furthermore, the Bank Secrecy Act required insured depository institutions to 
establish internal compliance and monitoring procedures, designate an institu-
tional compliance officer, and provide training for employees.240 The rationale 
was that “such records and reports are of a high degree of usefulness in criminal, 
tax, and other regulatory investigations.”241
  
234 Data Protection Act, § 28(1).  
   
235 Id. § 28(2)–(3).  
236 Id. § 28(4)–(5). 
237 See, e.g., Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-191, 110 
Stat. 1936; Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 2394; 
Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-503, 102 Stat. 2507 
(amended 1989, 1990); Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, Pub L. No. 100-618, 102 Stat. 
3195; Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848; Cable 
Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2780; Family Education and 
Privacy Rights Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-568, 88 Stat. 1855. 
238 Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (codified as 12 U.S.C. §§ 
1829(b), 1951–1959 (2003); 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311–5322 (2003)). 
239 See 31 C.F.R. § 1010.311 (2011) (outlining the regulations promulgated by the Treasury 
Department under the Bank Secrecy Act). The Bank Secrecy Act first introduced the requirement 
of filing “Currency Transactions Reports” (“CTRs”). This practice was later augmented by the 
Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act which required banks and other financial institu-
tions to file “Suspicious Activities Report” (“SAR”). Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering 
Act, 102 Pub. L. No. 550, 106 Stat. 4044 (1992) (codified in various sections of 12, 18, 31 and 42 
U.S.C.). Financial institutions were required to report “any suspicious transaction relevant to a 
possible violation of law or regulation.” 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(1) (2006). 
240 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h)(1)(A)–(C) (2006); 12 C.F.R. § 21.21(c) (2003) (describing compliance 
procedures for national banks pursuant to the Bank Security Act). 
241 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(a)(1)(A) (2006).  Congress also stated that “microfilm or other reproduc-
tions and other records made by insured depository institutions of checks, as well as records kept 
by such institutions, of the identity of persons maintaining or authorized to act with respect to 
accounts therein, have been of particular value in [criminal proceedings].” § 1829b(a)(1)(B). 
File: Baldwin and Koslosky Created on: 12/2/2011 3:34:00 PM Last Printed: 12/6/2011 12:15:00 PM 
2012] MISSION CREEP  701 
Following a backlash to the intrusion into common law financial priva-
cy of deposit holders,242 Congress enacted the Right to Financial Privacy Act.243  
The Right to Financial Privacy Act prohibited the disclosure of an account-
holder’s records without consent.244 Law enforcement and investigative authori-
ties could, however, obtain records without consent pursuant to search warrants, 
administrative and judicial subpoenas, or mere written requests.245 Customers 
were usually entitled to notice that records were the subject of a law enforce-
ment investigation with the caveat being that such notice could be delayed by 
court order.246
Somewhat counter-intuitively, the Bank Secrecy Act and the Right to 
Financial Privacy Act did not statutorily define the crime of “money launder-
ing.” Money laundering only became a criminal offense under the Money Laun-
dering Control Act of 1986.
  
247 The Act made it a crime to knowingly transfer248 
or conduct a financial transaction with the proceeds of an unlawful activity with 
the intent to continue the unlawful activity,249 evade taxation,250 conceal the 
nature of the proceeds,251 or avoid a reporting requirement.252
  
242 See, e.g., Peterson v. Idaho First Nat’l Bank, 367 P.2d 284, 290 (1961) (holding a duty of 
confidentiality found in the law of agency); Grainy Dev. Corp. v. Taksen, 400 N.Y.S.2d 717, 720 
(Ct. App. 1978) (stating that there is a duty on the part of a bank not to disclose information re-
garding the customer’s depository account), aff’d, 411 N.Y.S.2d 756 (1978); Tournier v. National 
Provincial and Union Bank of England, [1924] 1 Eng. Rep. 461 (K.B.) (finding a duty of confi-
dentiality based on the law of contract). 
 Interestingly, the 
Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 also criminalized money spending. To 
knowingly engage “in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property of a 
243 Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3697 (1978) (codified 
at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–3422(1982)). 
244 12 U.S.C. § 3402(1) (2006).   
245 §§ 3402(2)–(5). Written requests are governed by 12 U.S.C. § 3408, which provides that 
they are appropriate when (1) no subpoena “reasonably appears to be available,” (2) the request is 
authorized by agency regulations, and (3) “there is reason to believe that the records sought are 
relevant to a legitimate law enforcement.” §§ 3408(1)–(3).  
246 § 3409. The records sought must be in furtherance of a “legitimate law enforcement in-
quiry.” § 3409(a)(2). Additionally there must be reason to believe that notice would (1) endanger 
personal safety, (2) result in flight from prosecution, (3) result in evidence destruction or tamper-
ing, (4) cause the intimidation of potential witnesses, or (5) jeopardize the investigation or delay 
an official proceeding. § 3409(a)(2)(A)–(E).   
247 Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207–18. For an 
overview of the Money Laundering Control Act see generally Charles Thelen Plombeck, Confi-
dentiality and Disclosure: The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 and Banking Secrecy, 22 
INT’L L. 69 (1988). 
248 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3) (2006).  
249 § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i).  
250 § 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii). 
251 § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i).  
252 § 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii).  
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value greater than $10,000”253 was punishable by up to ten years incarcera-
tion.254
B. Britain and Terrorist Financing 
 Yet since the 1978 Right to Financial Privacy Act, the right to financial 
privacy has been substantially altered. 
Current efforts to deprive terrorist organizations from obtaining finan-
cial resources had their roots, like other anti-terrorism provisions, with the Pre-
vention of Terrorism Acts. As was the case with incursions into the criminal 
law, civil forfeiture and asset freezing gradually expanded in complexity and 
scope. The legal framework used by British authorities to starve the IRA of re-
sources was expanded and applied to current efforts to combat Al-Qaeda financ-
ing as presented below. 
1. Defunding the IRA  
British efforts to stop terrorist financing developed in conjunction with 
the efforts to criminalize the actions of the IRA in Northern Ireland. The origi-
nal 1973 Emergency Provisions Act authorized the seizure of property that is 
suspected of having been or currently being used to commit a terrorist of-
fense.255  Upon conviction of membership in a proscribed organization, the Act 
permitted forfeiture of “any money or other property which at the time of the 
offense he had in his possession or under his control for the use or benefit of the 
proscribed organization.”256 These provisions were carried directly into the Pre-
vention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974.257 Solicitation of finan-
cial support for a proscribed organization was also incorporated into the list of 
criminal offenses relating to membership in a terrorist organization.258
By 1989, the list of statutory offenses related to terrorist financing had 
greatly expanded. The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 
enacted in 1989, both broadened the scope of previous crimes relating to terror-
ist financing and added additional related offenses. In addition to solicitation of 
money for the commission of a terrorist offense, it was deemed a crime to have 
“enter[ed] into or [be] otherwise concerned in an arrangement whereby money 
 
  
253 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a) (1986). The Money Laundering Control Act defines “monetary transac-
tion” as “the deposit, withdrawal, transfer, or exchange, in or affecting interstate or foreign com-
merce, of funds or a monetary instrument.” § 1957(f)(1). It is to be noted that the Money Launder-
ing Prosecution Improvements Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4354 (1988), further 
amended the Bank Secrecy Act by increasing the scope of the definition of what constitutes a 
“financial institution.” 18 U.S.C. § 5326(3)(b) (2006). 
254 § 1957(b)(1). 
255 Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1973, c. 53, § 11(3) (Eng.).  
256 § 19(2).  
257 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1974, c. 56, § 1(7) (Eng.). 
258 § 1(1)(b). 
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or other property is or is to be made available to another person” or the benefit 
of such an organisation.”259 The mens rea requirement was, moreover, reduced. 
Where the 1974 Act required that a person “knowingly” provide financial sup-
port to a terrorist organization, the 1989 Act required a lesser showing that the 
individual have a “reasonable cause to suspect” the finances be used in the 
commission of, or in connection with a terrorist offense or organization.260 The 
1989 Act also made it a crime to assist in the retention of terrorist funds.261 The 
Act provides that “[a] person is guilty of an offence if he enters into or is other-
wise concerned in an arrangement whereby the retention or control by or on 
behalf of another person of terrorist funds is facilitated, whether by conceal-
ment, removal from the jurisdiction, transfer to nominees or otherwise.”262
The seizure authority of police services was also expanded in the 1989 
Act. In addition to the traditional requirements that the funds or property be 
under the possession or control of the suspected individual, only a requirement 
of having “reasonable cause to suspect” the funds would be directed toward a 
proscribed organization or toward the commission of a terrorism offense was 
sufficient to secure a conviction.
 
263 Indeed, the reasonable suspicion standard is 
operationally equivalent to the willful blindness test found in American criminal 
jurisprudence. The 1989 Act also established a framework for “forfeiture or-
ders,” court-ordered property seizures in connection with a crime relating to the 
financing of terrorism or a related offense.264
  
259 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989, c. 4, §§ 9(2)(b), 10(1)(c) (Eng.) 
(repealed).  
 Two years later, crimes relating to 
260 §§ 9–10.  
261 § 11. 
262 § 11(1).   
263 § 13(2)(b). 
264 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989, at sch. 4. Schedule 4 authorizes 
a court to make an order: 
(a) requiring any money or other property to which the forfeiture order ap-
plies to be paid or handed over to the proper officer or to a constable designat-
ed for the purpose by the chief officer of police of a police force specified in 
the order; 
(b) directing any such property other than money or land to be sold or oth-
erwise disposed of in such manner as the court may direct and the proceeds to 
be paid to the proper officer; 
(c) appointing a receiver to take possession, subject to such conditions and 
exceptions as may be specified by the court, of any such property which is 
land, to realise it in such manner as the court may direct and to pay the 
proceeds to the proper officer; 
(d) directing a specified part of any money, or of the proceeds of the sale, 
disposal or realisation of any property, to which the forfeiture order applies to 
be paid by the proper officer to or for a specified person falling within section 
13(6) of this Act; 
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financing terrorism were deemed to be “Scheduled Offenses” and thereby com-
ing under the jurisdiction of the juryless Diplock Courts.265 Additionally, the 
asset seizure process and criminal penalties were expounded upon.266
2. Implementing Resolution 1373 
 
The British legislative response to the September 11 attacks did not be-
gin anew, or in a vacuum, particularly relating to anti-terrorist financing meas-
ures. The initial British legislative response—the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and 
Security Act of 2001 (“ATCSA”)267
The ATCSA authorizes the civil forfeiture of terrorist cash that is either 
“intended to be used for the purposes of terrorism,” is the property of a terrorist 
organization, or is obtained through the use of terrorism.
—germinated directly from the Prevention 
of Terrorism and Emergency Provisions Acts designed to combat political vi-
olence in Northern Ireland. The ATCSA contained two primary tools relating to 
combating terrorist financing: civil in rem forfeiture and freezing orders.   
268 A collateral criminal 
prosecution for a related terrorist offense is not a prerequisite to executing civil 
forfeiture of terrorist finances.269 The Commissioner of Customs and Excise 
may make an application of forfeiture in magistrate court.270 Financial assets 
may be initially detained for forty-eight hours upon a reasonable suspicion that 
the funds are related to terrorism.271 A magistrate court may order the detention 
of such assets for not more than two years.272
Freezing orders, by contrast, are an extra-judicial means of disrupting 
terrorist finance networks. 
  
273
  
(e) making such other provision as appears to the court to be necessary for 
giving effect to the forfeiture order or to any order made by virtue of para-
graph (a), (b), (c) or (d) above. 
 The British Treasury may issue a freezing order if 
Sch. 4, § 1(1)(a)–(e).  
265 See Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1991, c. 24, sch. 1, § 20(b) (repealed).  
For a discussion of Diplock Courts, see supra Part II.A.3. 
266 Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1991, c. 24, at sch. 4.  
267 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24 (Eng.). Preceding the Anti-Terrorism, 
Crime and Security Act was the Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order 2001, No. 3365 
(Eng.). The United Nations Measures 2001 prohibited an individual from making funds available 
to those engaged in the commission or execution of terrorist-related offenses. Id. § 3. The Order 
also authorized the freezing of funds by the British Treasury. Id. § 4.   
268 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, § 1(1)(a)–(c).  
269 § 1(2). It is to be noted that terrorist financing also falls under the purview of the Proceeds 
of Crime Act, 2002, c. 29 (Eng.).   
270 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, sch. 1, § 6(1)(a).   
271 Sch. 1, § 3(1).  
272 Sch. 1, § 3(2)(b).  
273 “Freezing orders” are defined in the ATCSA as “an order which prohibits persons from 
making funds available to or for the benefit of a person or persons specified in the order.” Anti-
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, § 5(1).  
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it has a reasonable belief that an individual or organization is undertaking an 
action “to the detriment of the United Kingdom’s economy (or part of it)” or an 
action that constitutes a “threat to the life or property of one or more nationals of 
the United Kingdom.”274 Freezing orders must be submitted to Parliament, 
which has the power to extend the operational period of the freezing order 
beyond its original authorization.275
The ATCSA also contained several important provisions regarding the 
disclosure of financial information.
   
276 A freezing order may require the disclo-
sure of financial information to the Treasury if three criteria are met. First, the 
freezing order must contain a description of the person required to disclose the 
information.277 Second, the person required to make a disclosure “knows or sus-
pects, or has grounds for knowing or suspecting” that the person identified in 
the freezing order is a person whose funds are not to be made available.278 The 
person whose information is being disclosed is or has been a customer of or has 
had “dealings” with the discloser since the freezing order came into effect.279 
The third and last condition is that the information came into the possession of 
the discloser during the course of business.280
Resolution 1373 was given further effect by the Terrorism (United Na-
tions Measures) Orders 2006 and 2009.
 Because the disclosure is made by 
a private individual or entity, or may otherwise fall within its national security 
exception, it is unclear whether a certificate pursuant to the Data Protection Act, 
1998 is required prior to the disclosure.    
281 Both acts authorize the freezing of 
funds of “designated” individuals. An individual can be “designated” either by a 
decision of the European Council or by the Treasury.282 Under the 2006 Order, 
the Treasury can “designate” a person if it has “reasonable grounds for suspect-
ing” that the individual is attempting, facilitating, participating in, or has com-
mitted an act of terrorism.283
  
274 §§ 4(1), 4(2)(a)–(b).  
 This again echoes of the willful blindness standard 
in American jurisprudence. Alternatively, the Treasury can “designate” an indi-
vidual if it reasonably suspects that the person is “owned or controlled, directly 
275 § 10(2)(a)–(b).  
276 §§ 17–20. 
277 Sch. 3, § 6(2).  
278 Sch. 3, § 6(3). 
279 Sch. 3, § 6(3)(a)–(b).  
280 Sch. 3, § 6(4). 
281 The Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order, 2009, No. 1747 (Eng.); The Terrorism 
(United Nations Measures) Order, 2006, No. 2657 (Eng.). 
282 The Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order, 2006, § 3(1); The Terrorism (United Na-
tions Measures) Order, 2009, § 3(1). See also Council Decision 379, Implementing Article 2(3) of 
Regulation (EC) No. 2580/2001 on Specific Restrictive Measures Directed Against Certain Per-
sons and Entities with a View to Combating Terrorism and Repealing Decision 2005/930/EC, 
2006 O.J. (L 144) (EC).  
283 The Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order, 2006, § 4(2)(a).   
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or indirectly, by a designated person” or acted on behalf of a “designated” per-
son.284 The 2009 Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order added two signifi-
cant caveats. First, the seized funds must be deemed to be of “a significant fi-
nancial benefit” for the designated individual.285 The 2009 Act also required that 
Treasury designations are “necessary for purposes connected with protecting 
members of the public from a risk of terrorism.”286
The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, however, invalidated the 
designation previsions of the 2006 Act.
 
287 Four British citizens residing in East 
London were informed that they were designated pursuant to article 4 of the 
Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order of 2006, on the basis that an Al-
Queda operative identified them as terrorist facilitators, none of whom had been 
charged with a terrorist-related offense.288 The Supreme Court held that the 
modifying language “reasonable grounds for suspecting” was ultra vires in light 
of the requirements that domestic implementation of a Security Council deter-
mination, not involving the use of military force, be necessary and expedient.289  
The U.K. Supreme Court stated that the necessity and expedient requirements 
allow the United Kingdom to meet its United Nations obligations. Yet 
“[c]onferring an unlimited discretion on the executive as to how those resolu-
tions, which it has a hand in making, are to be implemented seems to me to be 
wholly unacceptable. It conflicts with the basic rules that lie at the heart of our 
democracy.”290
  
284 § 4(2)(c)–(d).   
 
285 The Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order, 2009, §§ 12(4)(a), 13(3)(a), 14(4)(a). 
286 § 4(1)(b).  
287 Her Majesty’s Treasury v. Mohammed Jabar Ahmed, [2010] 2 UKSC (appeal taken from 
EWCA Civ 1187) (U.K.). The U.K. Supreme Court noted that although the legality of the 2009 
Act was not an issue presented, “the arguments that have been directed to the 2006 Order (“the 
TO”) can be taken to apply to it [the 2009 Act] also.” Id. ¶ 28.  
288 Id. ¶ 32.  
289 Id. ¶¶ 58, 83. See also United Nations Act, 1946, c. 45 (Eng.). The relevant provision reads:  
If, under article forty-one of the Charter of the United Nations signed at San 
Francisco on the twenty-sixth day of June, nineteen hundred and forty-five, 
(being the article which relates to measures not involving the use of armed 
force) the Security Council of the United Nations call upon His Majesty’s 
Government in the United Kingdom to apply any measures to give  effect to 
any decision of that Council, His Majesty may by Order in Council make such 
provision as appears to Him necessary or expedient for enabling those meas-
ures to be effectively applied, including (without prejudice to the generality of 
the preceding words) provision for the apprehension, trial and punishment of 
persons offending against the Order. 
§ 1(1) (emphasis added).   
290 Her Majesty’s Treasury v. Mohammed Jabar Ahmed, [2010] 2 UKSC (appeal taken from 
EWCA Civ 1187) (UK) ¶ 45.  
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C. The PATRIOT Act 
The American response to Resolution 1373 was the PATRIOT Act.  
The PATRIOT Act is, to say the least, comprehensive legislation. It covers six-
teen broad subjects in 161 sections.291 Like the British legislative responses to 
terrorism, the PATRIOT Act was passed quickly and without substantial con-
gressional debate or amendment.292 On October 4, 2001, the PATRIOT Act was 
introduced in the Senate.293 Five days later, Senator Harry Reid “announced that 
the bill would be held at the desk rather than being referred to committee for” 
revision.294 Then-Majority Leader Tom Daschle subsequently asked for un-
animous consent that the Senate take up the legislation in order to limit possible 
amendments.295 The three amendments offered by Senator Russell Feingold 
designed to curb some of the power of federal officials operating under the Act 
were all tabled,296 and the Senate voted 96-1 to adopt the PATRIOT Act on Oc-
tober 11, 2001.297
1. Title III: Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering 
  
Title III of the PATRIOT Act applies to financial crimes including ter-
rorist financing, organized crime proceeds, and money laundering. Title III is 
effectively a comprehensive amendment to the Bank Secrecy, Right to Financial 
Privacy, and Money Laundering Control Acts. Indeed, it boasts its own special 
designation as the International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-
Terrorist Financing Act of 2001.298
The definition of what constitutes a financial institution for purposes of 
Title III is construed in the broadest possible terms. Private banks, casinos, and 
even the United States Postal Service are all considered financial institutions 
among twenty-three other entities outlined in Title III.
 
299
  
291 STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, RETHINKING THE PATRIOT ACT: KEEPING AMERICAN SAFE AND 
FREE 3 (2005).  
 Title III is divided into 
292 Beryl A. Howell, Seven Weeks: The Making of the USA PATRIOT Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1145, 1146 (2004).  
293 Id. at 1167. 
294 Howell, supra note 292, at 1167. This procedure is used to expedite the passage of legisla-
tion and limit amendments in deference to the executive. Id. The previous day, October 8, 2001, 
Attorney General Ashcroft announced the arrest of 614 individuals and the continued search for 
229 additional individuals. Id. This expedited legislative procedure was utilized for anti-terrorism 
legislation following the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 1995 Oklahoma City bomb-
ing. Id. at n.147.  See also 147 CONG. REC. S19,004 (Oct. 9, 2001). 
295 147 CONG. REC. S10,363 (Oct. 9, 2001); Howell, supra note 292, at 1167–68. 
296 Howell, supra note 292, at 1170–72. 
297 Id. at 1172. 
298 Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 333 (2001). 
299 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2)(A)–(Z) (2006). For purposes of the PATRIOT Act, a “financial 
institution” includes insured banks, commercial banks, trust companies, private bankers, branches 
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three subtitles. The first, Subtitle A, imposes criminal liability for multiple of-
fenses relating to money laundering.300 It introduces the concept of “special 
measures” which can be imposed on financial institutions by the Secretary of 
the Treasury.301 Special measures may be invoked when, inter alia, there is evi-
dence of terrorist financing or organized crime. Considered are the extent of 
financial secrecy in a jurisdiction, the relationship between the size of the trans-
action and that of the jurisdiction, and the experience of U.S. officials in obtain-
ing information in that jurisdiction.302 If the Secretary of the Treasury deter-
mines that an account is of “primary money laundering concern,” special meas-
ures may require financial institutions to keep comprehensive records concern-
ing aggregate transaction amounts, and information on each transaction involv-
ing foreign jurisdictions.303 The information obtained may be retained until the 
identities of the owner and recipient of the funds, as well as their legal capaci-
ties, are identified.304
Subtitle B of Title III is a sweeping amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act 
of 1970. It eliminates customer notification requirements when banks disclose 
their records. Recall, the Bank Secrecy Act provided that financial institutions 
were required to keep records regarding financial transactions in excess of 
$10,000, and institute internal compliance procedures.
 
305 This was then supple-
mented by the Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act, which required 
the filing of a Suspicious Activities Report (“SAR”) for suspect transactions.306
  
of foreign banks, credit unions, a thrift institutions, securities brokers, commodities brokers, in-
vestment bankers, investment companies, currency exchanges, issuers/redeemer/cashiers of trav-
elers’ checks and money orders, credit card system operators, insurance companies, jewelers, 
pawn shops, loan companies, travel agencies, conventional and unconventional money senders, a 
licensed sender of money or any other person who engages as a business in the transmission, 
telegraph companies, automobile/airplane/boat salesmen, real estate brokers, the United States 
Postal Service, and casinos. Furthermore, a “financial institution” is defined for purposes of the 
Act as “any business . . . which the Secretary of the Treasury determines, by regulation, to be an 
activity which is similar to, related to, or a substitute for any activity in which any business de-
scribed in this paragraph is authorized to engage” or “any other business designated by the Secre-
tary whose cash transactions have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory mat-
ters.” Id.   
  
Notwithstanding the reporting requirements, bank customers were entitled under 
300 PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 333 (codified in scattered sections of 12, 18, 
21, and 31 U.S.C.).   
301 31 U.S.C. § 5318A(a)(1) (2006).  
302 § 5318A(c)(2)(A)(i)–(vii); see also § 5318A(c)(2)(B) (outlining the institutional factors the 
Secretary of the Treasury may consider when implementing special measures).  
303 § 5318A(b)(1)(A). 
304 § 5318A(b)(1)(B).  
305 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(b)(1) (2011). 
306 Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act, Pub. L. No. 102-550, 106 Stat. 4044 (1992) 
(codified in scattered sections of 12, 18, 31 and 42 U.S.C.).   
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the Bank Secrecy Act, as amended, to give notice prior to the disclosure of 
records to law enforcement authorities.307
Another provision of significance to the confidentiality of financial 
records is section 505.
  
308 Found in Title V, section 505 amends the Right to 
Financial Privacy Act.309 The PATRIOT Act widened the scope of FBI investi-
gatory powers relating to financial records. Rather than being required to obtain 
a warrant, an FBI Special Agent in Charge at a field office may submit a Na-
tional Security Letter and obtain confidential financial records from any finan-
cial institution.310 The only requirement is that the request must be made in the 
furtherance of “clandestine intelligence activities” or the prevention of “interna-
tional terrorism.”311
The PATRIOT Act significantly erodes traditional notions of privacy 
afforded to bank customers and the autonomy by which financial institutions 
can conduct business. Reporting financial transactions above the $10,000 thre-
shold now go to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”), which 
the Act made a bureau of the Treasury department.
 
312 FinCEN has become a de 
facto clearinghouse of information from financial institutions.313 Notification to 
the individual engaged in a transaction which has been reported by the bank or 
financial institution is now prohibited. Neither the bank nor law enforcement 
agencies investigating a suspect transaction may provide any suspect notice that 
they are either under investigation,314 or are indemnified against civil or crimi-
nal liability for not providing notice to customers.315 Thus, the PATRIOT Act 
gives government authorities a significant tool to obtain private financial data in 
the name of national security.316
  
307 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401(4), 3402(1) (2006).   
 Taken as a whole, Title III creates a broad spe-
cial needs exception to financial privacy. An account holder’s previously estab-
lished expectation of privacy with regard to his or her financial data is reduced 
in light of the need to target terrorist financing.  
308 See 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(5)(A) (2006). 
309 §§ 3401–3422. 
310 § 3414(a)(5)(A). 
311 Id.  
312 31 U.S.C. §§ 310, 5331 (2006). 
313 C. WILLIAM MICHAELS, NO GREATER THREAT: AMERICA AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 AND THE RISE 
OF A NATIONAL SECURITY STATE 85 (2002). 
314 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(2)(i)–(ii) (2006). See Whitney Nat’l Bank v. Karam, 306 F. Supp. 2d 
678 (S.D. Tex. 2004) (holding that a defendant was precluded under the PATRIOT Act from 
obtaining records of Suspicious Activities Report filed by his or her financial institution). 
315 § 5318(g)(3). 
316 Anita Ramasastry, Lost in Translation? Data Mining, National Security and the “Adverse 
Inference” Problem, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 757, 768–69 (2006) (noting 
that “data mining” financial records constitutes a counter-terrorism policy). 
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2. Extraterritorial Effects on Banks  
The rationale of Title III is rooted in strong, and indeed correct, belief 
that foreign banks play a key role in illicit financial transactions.317 Congress 
found that “outmoded and inadequate statutory provisions that make investiga-
tions, prosecutions, and forfeitures more difficult, particularly in cases in which 
money laundering involves foreign persons, foreign banks, or foreign coun-
tries,” should be amended to facilitate investigations and successful prosecu-
tions.318 Congress further noted that “the ability to mount effective counter-
measures to international money launderers requires national, as well as bilateral 
and multilateral action, using tools specifically designed for that effort.”319 With 
those aims in mind, Title III’s enactment significantly expanded the transnation-
al authority of domestic law enforcement agencies by codifying United States 
forfeiture law.320 It set guidelines for prosecuting international financial crimes 
and terrorist financing.321
Congress added a new provision to the federal civil forfeiture statute.
 Title III also heightened the recordkeeping and report-
ing requirements of financial institutions.  
322 
The new provision, section 981(k), outlines special rules for forfeitures from 
interbank accounts held by foreign banks at banks in the United States.323
  
317 See PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 302(a)(4)–(5), 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (2006).  The 
provision stated: 
 This 
section states: 
[C]ertain jurisdictions outside of the United States that offer “offshore” bank-
ing and related facilities designed to provide anonymity, coupled with weak 
financial supervisory and enforcement regimes, provide essential tools to dis-
guise ownership and movement of criminal funds, derived from, or used to 
commit, offenses ranging from narcotics trafficking, terrorism, arms smug-
gling, and trafficking in human beings, to financial frauds that prey on law-
abiding citizens;  transactions involving such offshore jurisdictions make it 
difficult for law enforcement officials and regulators to follow the trail of 
money earned by criminals, organized international criminal enterprises, and 
global terrorist organizations. 
Id.  
318 § 302(a)(8).  
319 § 302(a)(9).   
320 See 1 OTTO G. OBERMAIER & ROBERT G. MORVILLO, WHITE COLLAR CRIME: BUSINESS AND 
REGULATORY OFFENSES 6A.01, at 6A-4 (2002). 
321 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(B) (2006) (outlining foreign crimes that can be used as predicates 
for a money laundering offence, public corruption, and all crimes of violence). Thus, the launder-
ing of the proceeds of any offence and the transfer of any funds into or out of the United States 
with the intent of promote any such offense is a violation of the law. Id. 
322 18 U.S.C. § 981(k) (2006).  
323 § 981(k)(4)(A). An “interbank account” is defined as “an account held by one financial 
institution at another financial institution primarily for the purpose of facilitating customer trans-
actions.” 18 U.S.C. § 984(c)(2)(B) (2006). 
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For the purpose of a forfeiture under this section . . . if funds are 
deposited into an account at a foreign financial institution, and 
that foreign financial institution . . . has an interbank account in 
the United States with a covered  financial institution . . . the 
funds shall be deemed to have been deposited into the interbank 
account in the United States, and any restraining order, seizure 
warrant, or arrest warrant in rem regarding the funds may be 
served on the covered financial institution, and funds in the in-
terbank account, up to the value of the funds deposited into the 
account at the foreign financial institution . . . may be  re-
strained, seized, or arrested.324
Interbank accounts—also known as correspondent accounts—are utilized by 
foreign banks to facilitate transactions in jurisdictions where the banks do not 
have physical presence. Liquidity, the internationalization of financial transac-
tions, and the need of foreign banks to have access to American currency have 
all necessitated the use of interbank accounts.
 
325 Indeed, Congress specifically 
noted the susceptibility of interbank accounts to be utilized in illicit financial 
transactions.326
It was relatively difficult for a federal agency to acquire the in rem for-
feiture of laundered funds in interbank accounts of foreign banks prior to the 
enactment of section 981(k).
 
327 Under the pre-amended forfeiture statute, a for-
eign bank was deemed to be the owner of interbank funds rather than individual 
depositors.328 Unless the bank “knowingly engaged” in money laundering, it 
was entitled to assert an innocent owner defense to a forfeiture action.329 In 
nearly all cases, a bank’s conduct would not meet a threshold of knowingly en-
gaged in criminal wrongdoing, thus most forfeiture actions would fail.330
Section 981(k) expanded the government’s civil forfeiture power in two 
significant ways. First, the section deems funds deposited at a foreign bank that 
 
  
324 § 981(k)(1)(A) (internal citations omitted).   
325 See MINORITY STAFF OF PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 107TH CONG., REPORT 
ON CORRESPONDENT BANKING: A GATEWAY FOR MONEY LAUNDERING 11–14 (Comm. Print 2001) 
[hereinafter LEVIN REPORT]. 
326 See PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 302(a)(6), 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (2006) (noting that 
“correspondent banking facilities are one of the banking mechanisms susceptible in some circums-
tance to manipulation by foreign banks to permit the laundering of funds by hiding the identify of 
real parties in interest to financial transactions”). 
327 See LEVIN REPORT, supra note 325, at 41–42. 
328 See United States v. Union Bank for Sav. & Inv. (Jordan), 487 F.3d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 2007) 
(discussing the pre-PATRIOT Act asset forfeiture statute).   
329 See 18 U.S.C. § 984(d)(1) (1994 & Supp. 5 1999) (stating that “[n]o action . . . to forfeit 
property not traceable directly to the offense that is the basis for the forfeiture may be taken 
against funds held by a financial institution in an interbank account, unless the financial institution 
holding the account knowingly engaged in the offense”).   
330 See Jordan, 487 F.3d at 15. 
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has an interbank account in the United States as deposited into an interbank ac-
count in the United States.331 Thus, any restraining order, seizure warrant, or 
arrest in rem against funds in a foreign bank may be served on a United States 
bank holding the interbank account.332 The deposit of forfeitable funds at a for-
eign bank triggers the forfeiture of an equivalent amount from an interbank ac-
count.333 Fluctuations in the amount held by the depositor at the foreign bank, as 
a result of periodic withdrawals and additional deposits from other licit sources, 
will not affect the forfeitability of funds.334 There is no requirement that any 
funds in an interbank account be traced to forfeitable funds deposited at the for-
eign bank.335
A second important change is how the owner of interbank funds may 
contest their forfeiture.
 
336 Under the new statute, the foreign depositor, rather 
than the foreign bank, is considered to be the owner of the funds.337 Only when 
the wrongdoing can be attributed to the foreign financial institution,338 or when 
the foreign financial institution can prove by a preponderance of evidence that it 
“discharged all or part of its obligation to the prior owner” will the financial 
institution be deemed the owner of the funds.339
Additionally, the revised statutory language reverses the burden of 
proof of the innocent owner defense. Under the previous statutory language, the 
government could not take action “against funds held by a financial institution 
in an interbank account, unless the financial institution holding the account 
knowingly engaged in the offense.”
  
340 Yet under the amended language, the 
claimant of the seized funds has the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that he or she was an innocent owner.341 The statute also imposes an 
affirmative obligation on the individual owner of the forfeited funds to prevent 
the use of those funds for illegal purposes “upon learning of the conduct giving 
rise to the forfeiture.”342 The revised statutory language in effect codifies 
Campbell v. Unites States and much of the willful blindness case law estab-
lished over the course of the preceding years.343
  
331 18 U.S.C. § 981(k)(1)(A) (2006). 
  
332 Id.  
333 § 981(k)(2).  
334 Id.  
335 Id.  
336 See § 981(k)(3) (authorizing actions to contest the forfeiture of funds). See also 18 U.S.C. § 
983 (2006) (outlining the procedures by which a contestation of forfeited funds may proceed). 
337 §§ 981(k)(4)(B)(i)(I)–(II). 
338 § 981(k)(4)(B)(ii)(I).   
339 § 981(k)(4)(B)(ii)(II).   
340 18 U.S.C. § 984(d)(1) (1994). 
341 18 U.S.C. § 983(d) (2006). 
342 § 983(d)(2)(A)(ii). 
343 See discussion supra Part II.B.2. 
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3. The Case of Union Bank  
A recent decision by the First Circuit illustrates how section 981(k) op-
erates in practice and affects both depositors and financial institutions. The case 
arose out of a Canadian telemarketing scheme, whereby individuals were in-
formed that they were eligible to collect proceeds of Canadian lottery winnings. 
In order to collect the winnings, they were to pay processing expenses by send-
ing cashier’s checks, drawn on U.S.-based accounts, to post office boxes in 
Montreal.344 After exchanging hands several times, those checks eventually 
made their way to a money exchange business in East Jerusalem.345 The proprie-
tors of the money exchange, Mohammed, Samir, and Talal Esseilheh, deposited 
the finds in their accounts at a Ramallah, West Bank branch office of Jordan-
based Union Bank for Savings and Investment (“Union Bank”).346 Union Bank 
transferred the U.S.-based cashier’s checks to its interbank account held at the 
Bank of New York (“BoNY”) to facilitate payment.347 BoNY gave Union Bank 
a provisional credit on its interbank account for the sum of the checks.348 None 
of the seized funds were ever transferred at any time to an account in the United 
States.349
The United Sates seized approximately $2.8 million from the interbank 
account as proceeds from the telemarketing scheme.
  
350 Union Bank filed an in 
rem claim in United States District Court for the amount of the seized funds, 
arguing, inter alia, that it was an innocent owner of the funds in its interbank 
account at BoNY.351 The government prevailed on its motion for summary 
judgment, arguing that Union Bank was not the owner of the funds, and that as a 
result, the bank lacked any right arising under section 981(k) to recover any of 
the funds.352
The First Circuit in Union Bank (Jordan) v. United States upheld the 
district court’s holding that the Esseilheh brothers were the owners of the depo-
sited funds, notwithstanding the money exchange did not have its own business 
 Both parties appealed. 
  
344 Jordan, 487 F.3d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 2007).  
345 Id.   
346 Id. at 11–12. The first Union Bank account was in the name of Samir Esseilheh.  Under the 
terms of a written agreement with Union Bank, Mohammed Esseilheh also had deposit and with-
drawal authority. This account was closed prior to the seizures, and the balance transferred to a 
second account. The second account was in the name of Mohammed Esseilheh. Union Bank per-
mitted the deposit of U.S. dollar-denominated instruments in the account. Samir Esseilheh and 
Talal Esseilheh served as guarantors on the account and thus they were, along with Mohammed 
Esseilheh, liable for the account. Id.  
347 Id. at 12.  
348 Id.  
349 Id. at 12–13. 
350 Id. at 10. 
351 Id. at 10, 13. 
352 Id. at 13.  
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account.353
Union Bank had grounded its defense on the assertion that it had dis-
charged all its obligations to the brothers at the time of the seizure. It could ac-
cordingly claim standing as an owner of the funds under the exception contained 
in section 981.
 The brothers, as joint venturers, were the owners of the funds at the 
time of deposit, and the accounts were used in the normal course of business.  
354 Moreover, it argued that its obligation to depositors should be 
linked to its ability to obtain recourse for the seizure of funds from the deposi-
tor. Under Union Bank’s depository relationship with the Esseilheh brothers and 
under applicable foreign law, it had no recourse to recover for the loss the bank 
would suffer through the seizure.355 The First Circuit rejected this argument as 
the bank’s obligations to the brothers were measured by their account balances. 
On the seizure date, the bank’s obligations to the brothers exceeded the amount 
of the forfeitable cashier’s checks, and thus it had not fulfilled the entirety of its 
obligations.356 The court also rejected the bank’s public policy arguments that 
its inability to collect from the foreign depositor would circumvent the ex-
pressed purpose of Congress in crafting the ownership provisions.357 The depo-
sitor, it was argued, would have no losses and thus no incentive to appear in a 
forfeiture proceeding.358 The court, however, noted that there was no evidence 
in the record why foreign banks could not protect themselves from seizure by 
contract or other agreement.359
According to the First Circuit, the legislative history of the provision 
suggested that Congress intended to treat foreign and domestic deposits, not 
foreign and domestic banks, similarly.
 
360 Thus, section 981(k) was intended to 
reach through the bank, as an intermediary, to particular depositors rather than 
specific accounts.361
Foreign banks thus face a dilemma. Title III of the PATRIOT Act grants 
comprehensive powers to the United States government to prescribe special 
measures against any foreign financial institution without jurisdictional consid-
 Thus, any pre-PATRIOT Act statutory construction man-
dating that forfeiture of illicit funds had to be directed at those contained in a 
specific account were inapplicable in light of the PATRIOT Act’s amendments 
to the civil forfeiture statute.  
  
353 Id. at 17–18.  
354 Id. at 18.  See 18 U.S.C § 981(k)(4)(B)(ii)(II) (2006) (“The foreign financial institution . . . 
may be considered the ‘owner’ of the funds only if—[it] establishes, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that prior to the restraint, seizure, or arrest of the funds, the foreign financial institution . 
. . had discharged all or part of its obligation to the prior owner of the funds.”).   
355 Jordan, 487 F.3d at 18. 
356 Id.  
357 Id. at 19. 
358 Id.  
359 Id. at 19–20. 
360 Id. at 21. 
361 Id. at 21–22. 
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erations.362 Union Bank could not seek recourse from the brothers based upon 
the customer agreements and guarantees, as they provided that the brothers 
would be liable when a deposited check is “proved to be invalid, counterfeited 
or unacceptable for cashing due to any reason whatsoever.”363 However, the 
BoNY presented the checks to the issuing banks for payment, none of which 
sought to reverse payment.364 All applicable statutory and regulatory time pe-
riods for a reversal had expired allowing for the credit on the foreign bank’s 
interbank account to become final. Therefore, the brothers were entitled to the 
funds as neither the customer service agreements nor the applicable banking 
laws provided any basis for Union Bank to recover based on the seizures.365
The Union Bank had to pay for its customer’s participation in money 
laundering and criminal offenses with little or no chance of recovery. Banks 
must decide whether the difficulty of recovering for any U.S.-based seizure 
from their customers requires them to implement additional contractual or secu-
rity measures. When United States agencies investigate a suspect transaction the 
agency may provide notice that the financial institution is either under investiga-
tion,
  
366 or can be indemnified against civil or criminal liability for not providing 
notice to customers.367 The risk of seizure in the United States may thus necessi-
tate that foreign banks initiate anti-money laundering programs which exceed 
what they would be required to do under the laws of their home country. Al-
though this is desirable, conflicts may develop when the bank has varying, man-
dated duties under its domestic banking laws and those of the United States.  
Section 981(k) does permit consideration of whether a forfeiture proceeding 
should be terminated due to a conflict of law between the United States and the 
foreign bank’s home jurisdiction.368 However, this provision will only apply if it 
is in the interest of justice to do so and provided that national interests of the 
United States are not harmed.369
4. Inter-Agency Information Sharing  
  
One aspect of the causal analysis following the September 11 attacks 
that became prominent in the national security reform discourse was the lack of 
information sharing between federal agencies.370
  
362 Id. at 20. 
 Members of Congress would 
363 Id. at 12–13. 
364 Id. at 12. 
365 Id. at 12–13. 
366 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(B)(2)(i)–(ii) (2006). See Whitney Nat’l Bank v. Karam, 306 F. Supp. 
2d 678 (S.D. Tex. 2004). 
367 § 5318(g)(B)(3). See also Ramasastry, supra note 316, at 768–69. 
368 18 U.S.C. § 981(k)(1)(B) (2006). 
369 Id. 
370 See, e.g., SEPTEMBER 11 AND THE IMPERATIVE OF REFORM IN THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE 
COMMUNITY (ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR RICHARD C. SHELBY) at 5 (December 10, 2002) 
 
File: Baldwin and Koslosky Created on:  12/2/2011 3:34:00 PM Last Printed: 12/6/2011 12:15:00 PM 
716 WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 114 
come to see increased information sharing as a key reform component in light of 
the Central Intelligence Agency not sharing information regarding the possible 
use of aircraft as weapons, or its suspicions of the individuals who would later 
pilot a plane into the Pentagon. The legislative response to these concerns—
notably PATRIOT Act section 218—would fly in the face of decades of juri-
sprudence and constitutional safeguards.   
a. Conventional Distinctions Between Foreign Intelli-
gence and Criminal Investigations 
Traditionally, there has been a wall between criminal investigations and 
national security intelligence gathering. In United States v. United States Dis-
trict Court (“Keith”),371 the Supreme Court considered the executive’s power to 
conduct warrantless surveillance pursuant to the interests of national security.372 
The defendants in Keith were being prosecuted in the Eastern District of Michi-
gan for planting a bomb at a Central Intelligence Agency field office.373 During 
the course of the investigation, federal authorities used electronic surveillance to 
monitor conversations of the defendants. The district court convened a prelimi-
nary hearing to ascertain whether the intelligence information gathered had 
“tainted” the evidence contained in the indictment which was to be introduced at 
trial.374 Judge Damon J. Keith held that the surveillance evidence was obtained 
in violation of the Fourth Amendment.375
The Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment required the gov-
ernment to obtain a warrant during the course of a domestic national security 
investigation.
 
376 In finding no Fourth Amendment exception applicable to do-
mestic security threats, the Court balanced the risk of “unreasonable surveil-
lance to individual privacy and free expression” against the government’s duty 
to keep the United States safe.377 Specifically, the Supreme Court looked to 
whether the surveillance was “deemed necessary” to a national security investi-
gation.378
  
(stating that the September 11 attacks “should be an object lesson in the perils of failing to share 
information promptly and efficiently between (and within) organizations”).  
 The surveillance was required to be “directed primarily to the collect-
ing and maintaining of intelligence with respect to subversive forces, and [was] 
371 407 U.S. 297 (1972). 
372 Id. at 299.  
373 Id.  
374 Id. at 300. 
375 Id. at 301. 
376 Id. at 321.  
377 Id. at 314–15.  
378 Id. at 308–09.  
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not an attempt to gather evidence for specific criminal prosecutions.”379 The 
“primary purpose” test was also incorporated directly into the Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act (“FISA”), the statutory framework governing the proce-
dures by which electronic surveillance and physical searches are conducted. 380
In United States v. Falvey,
 
381 the District Court for the Eastern District 
of New York was confronted with the admissibility of electronic surveillance 
evidence obtained pursuant to FISA at trial.382 The government sought to intro-
duce telephone conversations of the defendants—all United States citizens—
who were suspected of smuggling weapons to the IRA.383 The defendants were 
provided notice and the transcripts of all the wiretaps as well as documentation 
of “minimization logs” kept by law enforcement pursuant to FISA and constitu-
tional requirements.384
The district court held that the electronic evidence gathered pursuant to 
FISA was admissible in criminal proceedings.
  
385 The court found the primary 
purpose of the surveillance was to obtain foreign intelligence, and as such did 
run afoul of the Keith requirements.386 The court also noted that the government 
did not have a carte blanche for obtaining information after the primary purpose 
test had been satisfied. The resulting search and seizure forting intelligence sur-
veillance was still required to be “reasonable” for purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment.387
b. Blurring Intelligence Gathering and Criminal Investiga-
tions 
  
Section 203(a) of the PATRIOT Act changed Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 6(e) to allow for the sharing of grand jury information.388
  
379 Id. at 318–19. For background on Keith see Seth F. Kreimer, Watching the Watchers: Sur-
veillance, Transparency, and Political Freedom in the War on Terror, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 133, 
145–48 (2004).   
 Grand jury 
380 The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, § 1804(a)(7)(B) Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 
1783 (1978) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1811(1982)) provided that the “purpose of the sur-
veillance is to obtain foreign intelligence information.” FISA further required “minimization” 
procedures to curtail the collection, retention, and dissemination of information relating to Ameri-
can citizens.  §§ 1801(h), 1804(a)(5), 1805(a)(4). 
381 540 F. Supp. 1306 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). 
382 Id. at 1307–08. 
383 Id. at 1308. 
384 Id. 
385 Id. at 1314. 
386 Id. The district court noted that evidence obtained pursuant to FISA where the primary 
purpose is a criminal investigation is inadmissible in court. See United States v. Truong Dinh 
Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 912–13, 916 (4th Cir. 1980).   
387 Falvey, 540 F. Supp. at 1312. 
388 PATRIOT Act Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 203(a), 115 Stat. 272 (2001); FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e).  
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secrecy has long been a fundamental legal tenet traceable to English jurispru-
dence.389 Section 203(a) created an exception to Rule 6(e) by allowing grand 
jury information to be disclosed to a government attorney in the course of crim-
inal proceedings.390 One instance in which disclosure of grand jury information 
to an attorney of the United States is specifically authorized is financial 
crimes.391 In operation, section 203 permits unrestricted sharing of information 
related to terrorism.392 Essentially, a special needs exception mandating the dis-
closure of financial crimes information in criminal proceedings further erodes 
traditional understandings of bank secrecy and the secrecy of grand jury investi-
gations. Read in conjunction with the special measures permitted by Title III, 
the reduction of grand jury secrecy relating to bank crimes demonstrates how 
anti-terrorism legislation can permeate and infuse into other areas of law.393
The distinction between criminal and intelligence investigations was 
further eroded by PATRIOT Act section 218.
 
394 The preexisting FISA standard 
that “the purpose” of surveillance is to gather foreign intelligence was replaced 
by a lower threshold of constitutionality requiring only that foreign intelligence 
gathering be “a significant purpose” of surveillance.395
  
389 See United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958) (holding that grand jury 
secrecy is not to be violated except for reasons substantially necessary); Mark Kadish, Behind the 
Locked Door of an American Grand Jury: Its History, Its Secrecy, and Its Process, 24 FLA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 1, 13 (1996); Sara Levy, The PATRIOT Act Grand Jury Disclosure Exception: A Proposal 
for Reconciling Civil Liberties and Law Enforcement Concerns, 5 CHI.-KENT J. INT'L & COMP. L. 
2 (2005). 
 The constitutionality of 
the significant purpose standard was considered by the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court (“FISC”).  
390 See PATRIOT Act § 203(a); FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3). 
391 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3); 18 U.S.C. § 3322(b)(1) (2006).  The statute provides:  
Upon motion of an attorney for the government, a court may direct disclosure 
of matters occurring before a grand jury during an investigation of a banking 
law violation to identified personnel of a Federal or State financial institution 
regulatory agency—  
(A) for use in relation to any matter within the jurisdiction of such regulatory 
agency; or  
(B) to assist an attorney for the government to whom matters have been dis-
closed . . . . 
Id.   
392 Kate Martin, Why Sections 203 and 905 Should be Modified, in PATRIOT DEBATES 6 (Ste-
wart A. Baker & John Kavanagh eds., 2005).   
393 Jennifer M. Collins, And the Walls Came Tumbling Down: Sharing Grand Jury Information 
With the Intelligence Community Under the USA PATRIOT Act, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1261, 1286 
(2002). 
394 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B) (2006). 
395 Id. (emphasis added); see generally William C. Banks, And the Wall Came Tumbling Down: 
Secret Surveillance After the Terror, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1147, 1174–81 (2003) (discussing the 
erosion of the foreign intelligence and criminal investigation dichotomy). 
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The FISC exercises jurisdiction over “applications for and grant orders 
approving electronic surveillance anywhere within the United States.”396 Subse-
quent to the passage of the PATRIOT Act the Department of Justice moved to 
vacate the intelligence sharing procedures dealing with minimization and intel-
ligence sharing as required by FISA.397 Originally promulgated by the Attorney 
General in 1995, these procedures construct a legal “wall”398 separating intelli-
gence gathering and criminal investigations by curtailing the collection and dis-
semination of intelligence information gathered about American citizens.399
The government proposed to amend the guidelines by allowing criminal 
prosecutors to advise and consult with intelligence officials in the course of in-
vestigations.
  
400 The FISC rejected the idea that law enforcement and intelligence 
operations could be combined and denied the Justice Department’s request. It 
held that the separation of criminal and intelligence investigations was eliminat-
ed by the proposed amendments, which gave “criminal prosecutors every legal 
advantage . . . used by U.S. intelligence agencies.”401 As such, the protection of 
individual privacy was unfairly encumbered by the competing interest of col-
lecting foreign intelligence.402
The opinion was, however, overruled on appeal by the Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Court of Review (“FISCR”); the first time it convened in its 
twenty-four year history.
 
403 The FISCR held in In re Sealed Cases404
  
396 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (2006). See also 50 U.S.C. § 1822(c) (2006) (granting FISC jurisdiction 
over physical searches conducted pursuant to FISA). 
 that the 
FISA as intended by Congress “clearly did not preclude or limit the govern-
397 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(h), 1804(a)(5), 1805(a)(4) (2006); In re All Matters Submitted to For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 613 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct., 2002). 
398 See STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, RETHINKING THE PATRIOT ACT: KEEPING AMERICA SAFE AND 
FREE 37–38 (2005). 
399 See United States v. United States District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972). 
400 In re All Matters Submitted, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 622. 
401 Id. at 624. The FISC also added: 
[T]he plain meaning of consultations and coordination now specifically autho-
rized in the Act is based on the need to adjust or bring into alignment two dif-
ferent but complementary interests—intelligence gathering and law enforce-
ment. In FISA cases this presupposes separate intelligence and criminal inves-
tigations, or a single investigation with intertwined interests, which need to be 
brought into harmony to avoid dysfunction and frustration of either interest. If 
criminal prosecutors direct both the intelligence and criminal investigations, 
or a single investigation having combined interests, coordination becomes 
subordination of both investigations or [sic] interests to law enforcement ob-
jectives. 
Id. at 623–24.  
402 Id. at 625.  
403 Under the FISA, the Foreign Intelligence Court of Review has jurisdiction “to review the 
denial of any application made under this chapter.” 50 U.S.C. § 1803(b) (2006). 
404 310 F.3d 717 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002) (per curiam). 
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ment's use or proposed use of foreign intelligence information, which included 
evidence of certain kinds of criminal activity, in a criminal prosecution.”405 The 
FISCR stated that it was “puzzling” that the Department of Justice read the 
FISA as a limit on its ability to obtain foreign intelligence orders in cases it in-
tended to prosecute.406
As such, the court found that separating intelligence and criminal law 
was “a false dichotomy” rectified by section 218 of the PATRIOT Act.
  
407 The 
FISCR rejected the approach by the FISC of balancing interests of privacy and 
intelligence gathering.408 The “significant purpose” standard was held as consti-
tutionally valid since it still required the government to have a “measurable for-
eign intelligence purpose” consistent with the intent of the FISA.409 The FISCR 
stated that if the “sole objective” of the government in requesting a FISA war-
rant was criminal prosecution, it would be denied.410 However, if a federal 
agency “entertains a realistic option” in an investigation other than a criminal 
prosecution or “articulates a broader objective than criminal prosecution,” then 
the significant purpose standard is met.411
Moreover, the minimization procedures established under the FISA 
were construed so as to morph intelligence and criminal investigatory functions 
together. According to the FISCR, the minimization procedures established un-
der the FISA were not intended to limit the ability of a prosecutor to counsel 
federal intelligence agencies regarding “the initiation, operation, continuation, 
or expansion of FISA surveillances.”
  
412
D.  Mission Creep: The U.S. and Abroad  
 As such, the FISCR has significantly 
curtailed the legal mechanisms that previously separated intelligence and crimi-
nal functions of government and safeguarded individual liberty.  
Anti-terrorism legislation, both in the United States and abroad, has had 
an uncanny ability to perpetuate and morph itself from its original intent not-
withstanding the underlying threat. Both British anti-terrorist responses and the 
American PATRIOT Act altered substantive and procedural law. In Northern 
Ireland, due process rights once guaranteed to criminal defendants as bedrock 
principles of the common law were subordinated to the more urgent concerns of 
  
405 Id. at 727 (emphasis removed). The FISCR called into question the operating assumption of 
the FISC that there was an inherent barrier under the FISA between intelligence activities and 
ordinary law enforcement. Id. at 721.  
406 Id. at 723.  
407 Id. at 735; see also 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B) (2006). 
408 In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 735. 
409 Id.  
410 Id. 
411 Id. 
412 Id. at 731 (emphasis added). 
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national security.413 Anti-terrorist legislation in the United Kingdom was 
drafted, for instance, so as to target a specific group; only nationalist paramilita-
ry organizations were proscribed in the Prevention of Terrorism Acts.414
Yet, despite the metamorphic nature of legislation promulgated by the 
British Government in Westminster, it was to an extent controlled by an external 
judicial tribunal, the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”). The ECtHR 
in Borgan v. United Kingdom
  
415 held that the detention of suspects in Northern 
Ireland for between five and six days was incompatible with the European Con-
vention of Human Rights.416 In Ireland v. United Kingdom, the ECtHR also 
invalidated official British policy sanctioning the maltreatment of suspected 
terrorists.417 Moreover, the court entertained complaints from deaths resulting 
from British “shoot-to-kill” policies leading to settlement and compensation for 
victims’ families.418
However, even the presence of a supranational tribunal does not guaran-
tee the preservation of basic human rights or civil liberties. Much of current 
efforts targeting terrorist finances in the U.K. are embodied by civil forfeiture 
statues and are beyond the jurisdiction of the ECtHR.
 
419 However, British courts 
are becoming more adept at curtailing the usurpation of legislative power by the 
executive, as the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom did in Her Majesty’s 
Treasury v. Mohammed Jabar Ahmed.420
United States legal institutions, by contrast, do not contemplate an 
extraterritorial or international tribunal having the authority to invalidate anti-
terrorism polities whether originating under the PATRIOT Act, the FISA, or 
otherwise. The only legal institution capable of serving as a check on terrorism 
legislation is the federal judiciary. It is a fundamental canon of American juri-
sprudence that the judiciary ensure that acts of the executive and the legislature 
 Yet unknown is the extent to which 
civil forfeiture and other actions will be curtailed in light of the rights of ordi-
nary criminal defendants.  
  
413 See discussion supra Parts II.A.1. and II.A.3.  
414 See Prevention of Terrorism Act, 1974, c. 56, § 1(1)(a)–(b) sch. 1 (Eng.) (providing that the 
Irish Republican Army is the only organization to be proscribed and covered by penalties under 
the act). It is to be noted that the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 1989, Schedule 1 included only the 
Irish Republican Army and the Irish National Liberation Army, both republican paramilitary 
organizations. See supra notes 21–25 and accompanying text.    
415 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 117 (1989). 
416 Id. at 62. 
417 Eur. Ct. H.R. 25 (1978) (invalidating wall-standing, hooding, continuous noise, deprivation 
of food, and deprivation of sleep in interrogations). 
418 See Farrell v. United Kingdom, 5 Eur. Ct. H.R. 466 (1983). For a discussion of British 
“shoot-to-kill” polities with regard to suspected nationalist paramilitaries see EWING & GEARTY, 
supra note 19, at 230–41. 
419 IV EDWARD REES & RICHARD FISHER, BLACKSTONE'S GUIDE TO THE PROCEEDS OF CRIME 
ACT 2002, at 2–3 (2005). 
420 [2010] UKSC 2 (Eng.).    
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comply with the Constitution.421
Like the case of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, American 
anti-terrorist legislation is targeted at a specific entity. But this entity is not a 
class of people like the republican communities of Belfast or Derry.
 A potentially dangerous situation arises when 
the judiciary allows its own procedures to be altered by anti-terrorist legislation.  
422
Much of the basis of American anti-terrorist legislation has its roots in 
pre-2000 special needs exception and willful blindness jurisprudence. The 
PATRIOT Act’s provisions come harmoniously together, not only providing for 
virtually unlimited access to financial records under a legislatively-created spe-
cial needs exception, but also for eliminating the wall between intelligence ga-
thering and criminal investigations. The PATRIOT Act covers almost every 
conceivable entity involved in financial transactions, from the biggest interna-
tional bank to the local 7-Eleven.
 Rather, 
this entity is a specific class of crime that is defined by its institutional and legal 
nature. American anti-terrorist legislation is targeted largely at crimes offenses 
financial transactions, banks, and other financial institutions; areas that the law 
has traditionally afforded a degree of protection and confidentiality. 
423
Title III of the PATRIOT Act allows the Secretary of the Treasury to 
invoke “special measures” requiring any financial institution to keep and make 
available records involving designated accounts.
 The definition of what constitutes a finan-
cial institution is also so broad that the emergency legislation’s reach is omni-
present, affecting virtually every American from every walk of life.  
424 Customers of banks and 
other financial institutions are no longer entitled to notification regarding the 
filing of SARs due to Title III’s amendment of the Bank Secrecy Act.425 Moreo-
ver, a particular exception in Title V of the PATRIOT Act specifically allows 
federal law enforcement authorities to obtain financial information.426 The au-
thority is granted to the Special Agent in Charge who is merely required to file a 
National Security Letter.427
  
421 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).  
 This provision effectively places the assessment of 
422 This is not to say that Arab-Americans have not been forced to bear hardships of anti-
terrorism legislation, ethnic profiling, and civil rights deprivations resulting from the moral panic 
subsequent to the attacks on the World Trade Center, as well as the general Middle Eastern con-
struction of terrorism. See generally GEARTY, supra note 10, at 113 (arguing that popular concep-
tualizations of terrorism have arisen from violence associated with the Middle East); Michael 
Welsh, Trampling Human Rights in the War on Terror: Implications to the Sociology of Denial, 
12 CRIT. CRIMINOLOGY 1, 5–11 (2003) (discussing moral panic after the September 11 attacks).    
423 See 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2)(A)–(X) (2006). 
424 31 U.S.C. §§ 5318A(a)(1), 5318A(c)(2)(A)(i)–(vii), 5318A(c)(2)(B) (2006). 
425 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(2)(i)–(ii) (2006) (prohibiting financial institutions from giving notice to 
customers whose bank records were disclosed to investigative authorities); Whitney Nat’l Bank v. 
Karam, 306 F. Supp. 2d 678 (S.D. Tex. 2004) (holding that the PATRIOT Act precluded a defen-
dant from obtaining records of Suspicious Activities Report filed by his or her financial institu-
tion). 
426 See 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(5)(A) (2006). 
427 Id.  
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the reasonableness of the investigation and its techniques in the hands of the 
agents conducting the investigation themselves. The judicial check on executive 
branch investigations is altogether eliminated, risking unconstrained encroach-
ment by indefinite, unimpeded investigations into bank privacy and civil liber-
ties. 
Mission creep can also occur in the manner in which anti-terrorism leg-
islation is implemented. The Department of Justice currently contracts many of 
its functions arising under the PATRIOT Act’s authorization to outside contrac-
tors. Often these contractors employ newly graduated law students as “law 
clerks.” Despite only requiring the lowest level, “confidential” security clear-
ance, newly-graduated “legal” contractors work within the Department of Jus-
tice organization and carry out functions related to asset and data seizures. In-
deed, should legal malfeasance occur, questions may arise as to whether an un-
barred or newly barred law clerk was acting in the capacity as an attorney. Po-
tential abuses of power may also be complicated by issues such as contractual 
liability, indemnification, sovereign immunity, and so forth.  
The erosion of the distinction between criminal investigations and intel-
ligence gathering further magnifies the threat of mission creep regarding finan-
cial crimes. Sealed Case marked the effective coup de grace of the criminal-
intelligence dichotomy announced in Keith and utilized in subsequent investiga-
tions.428 Authorities conducting clandestine intelligence investigations pursuant 
to FISA are required only to demonstrate that a significant purpose of the inves-
tigation is the collection of foreign intelligence.429 The FISCR stated that this 
standard effectively inextricably combines criminal and intelligence investiga-
tions by allowing ordinary law enforcement officials to assist and consult with 
intelligence officers in the “initiation, operation, continuation, or expansion” of 
FISA surveillance.430
Defendants under federal criminal grand jury indictment are liable to 
have information disclosed to other investigatory agencies pursuant to the 
PATRIOT Act’s alteration of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
 
431 Grand 
jury information can now be disclosed to any government attorney, and is not 
limited to information regarding a threat or incident of terrorism.432
Thus, defendants are subject to an investigatory cul-de-sac by which an 
endless assault of evidence obtained in successive rounds of intelligence and 
 Not only 
does the information flow both ways—to and from both criminal and intelli-
gence investigations—but it also flows prior to and during the course of crimi-
nal proceedings.  
  
428 See United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. 
Falvey, 540 F. Supp. 1306 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). 
429 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B) (2006). 
430 In re Sealed Cases, 310 F.3d 717, 731 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002) (per curiam). 
431 PATRIOT Act Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 203(a), 115 Stat. 272 (2001); FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e). 
432 See Martin, supra note 392, at 6; Jennifer M. Collins, supra note 393, at 1286. 
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criminal investigations are brought to bear without any meaningful judicial su-
pervision. Once information is obtained by law enforcement pursuant to law 
created for anti-terrorist intelligence investigations, it may be shared with the 
intelligence community. Intelligence agencies then may utilize and disseminate 
information without restriction as they see fit back to law enforcement, which 
may then be able to open a new investigation into another alleged criminal ac-
tivity with respect to the same or different defendant. Further, defendants are not 
often given the chance to ascertain the veracity or challenge the admissibility of 
evidence obtained pursuant to FISA and introduced into evidence in criminal 
proceedings.433
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
  
Moral panic is a normal and logical consequence after a mass crime or 
terrorist attack. A legislative response to a threat to public safety or national 
security is often necessary to supplement existing criminal laws. However, such 
a response can also damage the gentle balance between security and liberty.  
Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States government 
enacted the most comprehensive changes and sweeping additions to the inves-
tigative authority of the United States government. In light of existing criminal 
jurisprudence, the PATRIOT Act risks attacking the institutional safeguards 
designed to protect individuals from the awesome investigatory powers of the 
state. American jurisprudence has traditionally afforded legal insulation of subs-
tantive and procedural rights against encroachment from the intelligence com-
munity to ensure that investigations are reasonably limited to comport with no-
tions of justice and fairness. However, this insulation has been eroded in the 
name of necessity. Special needs exceptions and willful blindness jurisprudence 
have both germinated into the judicial underpinnings of a comprehensive statu-
tory framework that risks curtailing the constitutional liberties of the American 
public.  
Anti-terrorism legislation in both the United States and the United 
Kingdom has penetrated into non-terrorist related offenses. Perhaps this is in-
evitable to the extent that laws are made and applied by imperfect individuals. 
The combination of the increased ability of investigatory agencies to obtain fi-
nancial data, and subsequently share it without impede puts the systemic integri-
ty of financial and legal institutions at unique risk. Although some of these 
measures are necessary in combating international terrorist networks, it is essen-
tial that legal institutions in the U.S. and abroad be vigilant in monitoring terror-
ist and non-terrorist related prosecutions, and prepared to constrain anti-
terrorism laws to that which they are intended, and guard against unwarranted 
encroachment.  
  
433 See United States v. Sattar, No. 02-CR.395(JGK), 2003 WL 22510435 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 
2003) (unpublished case) (holding a defendant is not entitled to a pretrial discovery hearing re-
garding evidence obtained pursuant to the FISA).  
